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ABSTRACT
Results of early studies (eg. Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978) on the effects of
supervisory styles on subordinates' job related tension have been contradictory.
Subsequent studies using the contingency model to resolve these conflicting results
have identified budgetary participation (Brownell, 1982a) and trust (Ross, 1994) as
important moderating variables. With respect to participation, a number of prior
studies found that a compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high
participation was associated with better behavioural outcomes (eg. lower job related
tension), than other combinations of budget emphasis and participation. Yet there has
been relatively little research to investigate why this particular combination of budget
emphasis and participation is associated with better behavioural outcomes.

This thesis therefore investigates a number of important issues. First, it investigates
whether different combinations of budget emphasis and participation affect
subordinates' propensity to create slack and job related tension differently. Second, it
examines whether a high budget emphasis-high participation combination results in
lower subordinates' propensity to create slack and lower job related tension than a low
budget emphasis-high participation combination. Third, it investigates the reasons
why a high budget emphasis-high participation combination leads to lower propensity
to create slack and lower job related tension.

The interaction between budget emphasis and participation was dealt with by testing a
model on supervisory styles in a high participatory environment. Norway was
hypothesised to have a high participatory environment because of its high power
distance culture and its highly centralised and formalised industrial relations systems
which emphasise democratic work environment. Moreover, its highly homogeneous
population and society are likely to result in a small diversity within its national

culture, which in turn, leads to a smaller range of participation. Hence participation in
Norway is expected to be not only high, but also widespread. This means that a high
budget emphasis situation in Norway is similar to a high budget emphasis and high
participation combination, whilst a low budget emphasis situation in Norway is similar
to a low budget emphasis-high participation combination. This allows a high budget
emphasis-high participation (Norway) situation to be compared with a low budget
emphasis-high participation (Norway) situation. Consequently, a high budget
emphasis situation in Norway, which is similar to a high budget emphasis and high
participation situation, is therefore expected to be associated with lower job related
tension than a low budget emphasis in Norway.

In order to investigate the reason why a high budget emphasis-high participation
combination promotes lower propensity to create slack and job related tension, path
analytical models, which investigate the intervening effects of participation, trust and
organisational commitment on the relationship between budget emphasis and
propensity to create slack/job related tension, were developed. Testing these models in
Norway permits two issues to be investigated. These are: (i) the interaction between
budget emphasis and participation affecting propensity to create slack/job related
tension, and (ii) the intervening effects of participation, trust and organisational
commitment on the relationship between budget emphasis and propensity to create
slack/job related tension.

The results support the expectation that Norwegian managers generally enjoy very
high level of budgetary participation. Second, they also support the expected
significant negative relationship between budget emphasis and job related tension.
Third, a high budget emphasis situation in Norway (high participatory) was found to
have only a small and insignificant direct effect of job related tension. Instead, there is
11

a strong indirect effect through trust. Based on these results, it is possible to conclude
that a high budget emphasis and high participation combination will lead to lower job
related tension. The reason for this is partly because this combination promotes higher
trust between the subordinates and their superior. Trust, in tum, leads to lower
subordinates' job related tension. These results provide valuable insights which help to
explain why a compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high
participation, found by a number of prior studies with the contingency model, can lead
to better behavioural outcomes than other combinations of budget emphasis and
participation.
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CHAPTER!

Introduction

Introduction

An important area of management accounting research is the relationship between
budget based evaluation styles and participation and its effect on subordinates'
behaviours
including job related tension and propensity to create slack. Management accounting
research has gradually evolved from a focus on budgetary control to a broader
organisational view. It has concentrated on explaining the most efficient managerial
evaluation style by examining the inter- and intraorganisational relations affecting the
use of accounting, and how members of the organisation utilise the information and
control system to benefit themselves or their organisation. A number of studies have
also recognised the dysfunctional effects of budgetary slack, which has been the focus
of a considerable number of studies in management accounting research. Finally, it
has also long been recognised that "enriched" jobs include factors such as job
satisfaction, jobs containing more variety, autonomy, feedback and participation,
which have led researchers to include variables, and combination of variables, that
when experienced in a positive fashion, should benefit the whole organisation and
consequently its members. This thesis thus seeks to further explore the relationships
between budget emphasis and budgetary participation and its effect on propensity to
create slack and job related tension by including two other variables, namely trust and
organisational commitment to bring -about a more integrated model to explain the
effects of evaluative styles on subordinates' behaviours.

1

Motivation for the study

The impact of performance evaluative styles on subordinates' attitudes and
performance has been the focus of much management accounting research interest.
The first systematic study in this area by Hopwood (l 972) indicated that an inflexible
approach in the use of accounting data to evaluate subordinates' performance was
associated with subordinates' job related tension and other dysfunctional behaviour.
Otley (l 978), however, was unable to replicate these results. Since then, a stream of
studies has examined a variety of variables, which could influence the relationships
between performance evaluative styles and a variety of behavioural outcome
variables. Whilst the results of these studies are not always consistent, the large body
of evidence accumulated has nevertheless provided some general patterns of these
relationships.

In particular, a remarkably consistent pattern appears to occur with respect to the
effects of budgetary participation. Brownell (1982a) argued that for beneficial
behavioural consequences to occur, an evaluative style with a heavy reliance on
accounting performance measures (high budget emphasis) should be complemented
with a high extent of budgetary participation. His results indicated that a compatible
match of a high budget emphasis and high participation was associated with high
managerial performance. Since then, a number of studies have found remarkably
consistent results with this particular combination of budget emphasis and
participation on a variety of behavioural outcomes in different environments. These
include Brownell & Hirst ( 1986) in low task uncertainty situation for job related
tension; Brownell & Dunk (1991) in low task difficulty situation for managerial
performance; Harrison (1992) in Australia and Singapore for job satisfaction and job
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related tension; Dunk (1993) in Australia for budgetary slack; Lau et al. (1995) in
Singapore for managerial performance; Lau & Tan ( 1998) in Australia and Singapore
-·

for the financial services sector managerial performance; Lau & Eggleton (1998) in
Australia and Singapore for propensity to create slack; and Lau & Buckland ( 1999) in
Norway for managerial performance.

This thesis attempts to extend on these relatively consistent results by examining a
number of previously unexplored issues. First, as participation is one of the two
crucial variables in the relationship, it is unclear if the results of prior studies were not
confounded by the lack of control over the effects of national culture and other
societal influences on this variable. Some researchers (eg., Hofstede, 1980; Brownell,
1982b; Harrison, 1992) have suggested that national culture could affect the extent of
budgetary participation and that high participatory environment could be found in
certain cultures. For instance, Harrison ( 1992) suggests that a high participatory
environment, where participation is widespread among members of the society, could
exist in a low power distance culture. This means that a study undertaken in a low
power distance culture may have respondents who are generally experiencing
relatively high participation in their organisations. As low participation is rare in such
a cultural environment, respondents described as having low participation may still
enjoy relatively high participation. Hence, a situation classified, as a /ow participation
situation in a low power distance culture could, in reality, still be a high participation
situation or be equivalent to a high participation situation in a different cultural
environment. Consequently, results of studies undertaken in a particular cultural
environment, for instance in high participatory cultures should be interpreted with
caution and their results may not be generalisable to other cultural environments. This
means that control over the impact of culture on participation is crucial for studies
investigating the effects of evaluative styles on behavioural outcomes. For this reason,

3

even though there have been many studies which examined the effects of evaluative
styles, there is a concern that the impact of the cultural environment on participation
may have been overlooked (Harrison, 1992). Hence, there is a need to undertake
further such studies which provide some control over the participatory environment.

With respect to this thesis, since it was previously noted that a high budget emphasis
evaluative style should be complemented with high participation, it follows that if a
high budget emphasis evaluative style is employed in a high participatory environment
such as in Norway, favourable behavioural outcomes should be expected. An
examination of the impact of performance evaluative styles on behavioural outcomes
in such a cultural environment would provide valuable evidence to consolidate the
theory in this research area pertaining to high participatory situations. The results of
such a study will only be generalisable to high participatory environment. But it would
be valuable and meaningful evidence to organisations operating in high participatory
cultural environments in the design and implementation of their control systems.
Moreover, the selection of Norway for study is also important in another aspect.
Norway, a country within the Nordic cultural region (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and
Finland) and located in continental Europe, which whilst very important economically,
has largely been overlooked by management accounting researchers (Lau & Buckland,
1999). Hence, the results of this thesis will not only extend the area of research
relating to the behavioural consequences of supervisory evaluative styles, but may also
provide interesting research insights into the control systems of a previously
unexplored Nordic cultural environment.

Whilst the expectation that beneficial behavioural outcomes will be associated with a
combination of high budget emphasis and high participation is relatively well
established, it remains unclear as to why this particular combination is generally found

4

to be better (in terms of favourable behavioural outcomes) than other combinations of
budget emphasis and participation. This thesis proposes that the extent of trust brought
about by the combination of high budget emphasis in a high participatory environment
is responsible for the favourable subordinates' behavioural outcomes. The positive

association between participation and trust has been suggested by some researchers
(eg., Meadow et al., 1959; Read, 1962; Parloff & Handlon, 1966). It is plausable that
increased communication is likely to reduce suspicion and mistrust. Similarly, Ross
( 1994, p. 630) found trust to be important in high budget emphasis situations. He

suggests that subordinates are likely to find evaluative styles based on relatively
"objective verifiable accounting measures" are easier to interpret and hence more
trustworthy than relatively subjective and ambiguous nonaccounting performance
measures which are difficult to interpret and subject to a "superior's biases and
idiosyncrasies". To date, the role of trust in a high budget emphasis and high
participatory environment has remained untested. The results of such a study may
provide valuable insight which helps to explain why a combination of high budget
emphasis and high participation is associated with functional behaviour.

The importance of organisational commitment
Another variable of interest to studies examining slack and job related tension is
organisational commitment. Recent interest on organisational commitment 1s
attributable to the recognition of the important role organisational commitment plays
in employees' attitudes and performance. Organisational commitment has mostly been
a major focus in studies of organisational behaviour, which have concentrated on
explaining the antecedents and consequences of organisational commitment.
According to Zahra ( 1984, p. 26); the common antecendents of organisational
commitment are background (ie., age, sex, race, education), organisational (ie., work

5

experience, leadership styles), personality and attitudinal. These variables determine to
varying degrees the efficiency of the organisation by explaining the underlying factors

-

for "efficient" workers. This thesis will further explore the relationship among budget
based evaluation styles, participation, propensity to create slack and job related
tension by suggesting that organisational commitment may have an intervening effect
in the model.

Organisational commitment has also been examined in the context of managerial
accounting. However, empirical research is rather limited. The first study was
conducted by Nouri (1994) who reported that organisational commitment and the
managers' propensity to create slack are negatively related. A later study by Nouri &
Parker ( 1996), integrated organisational commitment and budgetary participation
when examining their effects on slack. Most of the existing literature on budgetary
slack creation is grounded in agency theory propositions and argue that participation
gives the subordinate a better opportunity to introduce slack into the budget (Young,
1985; Lukka, 1988; Dunk, 1993) leading to a positive relationship between
participative budgeting and budgetary slack. However, Nouri & Parker suggested that
subordinates with strong organisational commitment would take advantage of their
budget influence to pursue organisational goals, whereas subordinates with low
organisational commitment would use their budget influence to primarily pursue selfinterest. In other words, the level of organisational commitment experienced by the
subordinate will determine his/hers likelihood of creating slack. Their findings
supported their hypotheses that an inverse relationship between participation and slack
exists for individuals with strong organisational commitment, whereas a positive
relationship between participation and slack exists for individuals with weak
organisational commitment.

6

In a recent study, Nouri & Parker (1998) examined organisational commitment as an
intervening variable when testing the relationship between budgetary participation and
job performance. They found that budgetary participation affects job performance
indirectly via organisational commitment and budget adequacy.

Other studies (eg., Rhodes & Steers, 1981; Welsch & LaVan (1981; DeCotiis &
Summers, 1987) also provide evidence of a positive link between employee
participation

and

organisational

commitment.

However,

studies

involving

organisational commitment have mostly concentrated on testing positive outcomes, ie
job performance or job satisfaction. These studies (eg. Aranya et al., 1982; Norris &
Niebuhr, 1983; Meixner & Bline, 1989; Pozanski & Bine, 1997) examined this
relationship on professional accountants. This thesis will provide further extension as
it will include slack creation and job related tension.

The lack of empirical evidence regarding trust

•

Omitted from studies on supervisory evaluative styles is the variable of trust. For
many years it has been recognised as an underlying phenomena in managerial
effectiveness. A few attempts to correlate trust and managerial effectiveness have not
been able to find any significant results (eg., House, 1967; Dunnette & Campbell,
1968). However, Zand ( 1972) succeeded in determining such a relationship. However,
generalising his results to other settings imposes difficulties.

Later studies (eg., Simmons, 1981) also suggest that trust is a prerequisite for
effective, humane and efficient organisations. Recently, Ross (1994) examined trust as
a moderating variable on the relationship between budget emphasis and job related
tension. He found that trust has ·a moderating effect on job related tension.
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Consequently, this thesis is motivated to apply the notion of trust developed in Zand's
( 1972) study to other formal (statistical) circumstances.

The

integration of budget emphasis. budgetary participation. organisational

commitment and trust
The above discussion indicates that a considerable number of researchers have studied
the impact of budget emphasis on slack and behavioural outcomes, such as job related
tension. Other studies have also examined the effectiveness of budgetary participation.
Whilst organisational commitment has been the subject of interest for mainly
organisational studies, it has not been examined extensively in management
accounting research. To date no study has integrated budget emphasis, budgetary
participation, organisational commitment and trust to examine their effects on slack
creation or job related tension.

As mentioned earlier, this thesis is also motivated by the lack of prior studies in this
area which include trust into their models. Several researchers have mentioned the
notion of trust without systematically accounting for it. For instance, Lau & Eggleton
( 1998) mentioned the importance of trust in the relationship between a subordinate
and a superior. They believed that subordinates will not create slack in order to not
jeopardise the level of trust the superiors have in them. Other researchers (eg.,
Merlinger, 1956; Read, 1962) suggested that trust will increase an organisation's
internal communication, especially between the subordinate and the superior. This
thesis will therefore integrate these variables into two different models. The model in
figure 1.1, show the relationships among budget emphasis, budgetary participation,
trust and organisational commitment and their affects on slack and job related tension.

8

Budgetary
Participation

Budget
Emphasis

TrustOrganisational
Commitment

___.

Slack
creation/JRT

Fig. 1.1

This thesis therefore examines the intervening effects of trust, budgetary participation
and organisational commitment on the relationship between budget emphasis and
propensity to create slack/job related tension in a high participatory environment. The
model in Figure 1.1 allows the hypothesised intervening effects to be observed.
Norway was chosen as a surrogate for a high participatory environment because of its
highly centralised and formalised industrial relations systems which emphasises
democratic work environment (Johansen, 1985) and its low power distance culture
(Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Lau & Buckland, 1999), which promotes high participation.
The Norwegian environment therefore allows the interaction between budget
emphasis and high participation to be observed. Hence testing the model in Figure 1.1
in Norway permits the observation of (i) the interaction effects of budget emphasis
and high participation; and (ii) the intervening effects of trust and organisational
commitment to be observed within an integrated model. It also allows Brownell's
(1982a) study to be combined with that of Ross ( 1994 ). Whilst examining the
interaction between budget emphasis and trust, Brownell had overlooked the
intervening effect of trust. Similarly, whilst examining the intervening effects of trust,
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Ross had overlooked the moderating effects of participation. This thesis incorporates
the effects of both of these variables into and integrated and more comprehensive
model.

Finally, this thesis is also motivated by the need to investigate the role of trust on the
important relationship between budgetary participation and subordinates' attitudes and
behaviour. Prior studies have suggested that budgetary participation is an important
predictor of subordinates' behaviour and attitudes (eg., Milani, 1975; Ken is, 1979).
However, according to Chenhall & Brownell (1988), the results in this research area
are fraught with inconsistencies partly because of the failure of prior studies to
consider the possibility that there may be no direct relationships between budgetary
participation and the outcome variables. They argued that "there is no theoretical
argument which can support simple, direct effects of participation on job satisfaction
or performance. Instead, the effects of participation, if any, are indirect and are
conveyed to outcome criteria via some intervening constructs which links the
variables." (p. 225-226). They found role ambiguity to be an important intervening
variable and concluded that "it is possible, indeed likely, that other variables can add
to the explanation of the indirect path between participation and criteria" (p. 232).
This thesis therefore provides further examination of another plausible intervening
variables, namely, trust and organisational commitment, which may mediate the
relationship between participation and subordinates' attitudes. The model to
investigate this proposition is incorporated in the model in Figure 1.1.

10

Purpose of study

The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, this thesis attempts to develop and test
empirically a theory on how the four predictor variables of budget emphasis,
budgetary participation, trust and organisational commitment affect the two dependent
variables of job related tension and the propensity to create slack. Second, this thesis
attempts to provide empirical evidence on the behavioural impact of control systems
from Norway, a country located in continental Europe, which whilst very important
economically, has largely been ignored by management accounting researchers (Lau
& Buckland, 1999). Hence, the results of this thesis will not only extent the area of
research relating to the behavioural consequences of supervisory evaluative styles, but
may also provide interesting insights into the control systems of a previously
unexplored Nordic cultural environment.

Aims of study and research questions

The focus of this thesis is to examine how budget emphasis, budgetary participation,
organisational commitment and trust affect job related tension and propensity to create
slack. The following are the research questions explored in this thesis:

( 1)

Does Norway have a high participatory environment?

(2)

Does budget emphasis affect job related tension and subordinates' propensity
to create slack in the Norwegian environment?

(3)

Are the relationships between budget emphasis and job related
tension/propensity to create sfack a direct one or indirectly through the
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intervening variables of (a) budgetary participation and trust; and/or (b)
budgetary participation and organisational commitment?
(4)

Does budgetary participation affect job related tension and subordinates'
propensity to create slack?

(5)

Are the relationships between budgetary participation and job related
tension/propensity to create slack a direct one or indirectly through the
intervening variables of (a) trust; and/or (b) organisational commitment?

(6)

Will the models developed for this study (see Figure 1.1) provide evidence to
explain the extent of subordinates' job related tension and propensity to create
slack and the reasons why these relationships occur?

(7)

Will the theory pertaining to the impact of evaluative styles and budgetary
participation on subordinates' behaviour be generalisable to the Nordic
cultural region?

Definition of variables

Four independent and two dependent variables are used in this thesis. The dependent
variables are the propensity to create slack and job related tension. The independent
variables are budget emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational commitment
and trust.

The propensity to create slack
The propensity to create slack refers to the extent of subordinates' attitude toward
slack

which is the extent of intentional understatement of the subordinate's

performance capability built into the budget by the subordinate to make budgeted
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targets easier to attain (Lau & Eggleton, 1988). The instrument used to measure the
propensity to create slack was developed by Onsi's (1973).

Job related tension
Job related tension refers to tension arising from psychologically stressful
circumstances in the job environment (Kenis, 1979).

Budget emphasis
Budget emphasis refers to the degree of reliance on accounting performance measures
to assess the performance of subordinates. A high budget emphasis occurs when a
superior adheres rigidly to accounting performance measures to evaluate their
subordinates' performance. Conversely, in situations with low budget emphasis,
superiors use non accounting performance criteria to evaluate their subordinates'
performance.

Budgetary participation
Budgetary participation refers to the degree of participation and/or influence a
subordinate has when setting budgets, which will be used as a criterion for the
evaluation of subordinates' performance.

Organisational commitment
Organisational commitment refers to three critical aspects of the relationship between
the individual and the employing firm. The first aspect refers to identification with and
attachment to the organisation and concern with its future. The second aspect refers to
the employee's desire to maintain his or her membership in the organisation. The third
refers to the effort expended by the individual to help achieve the goals of the
organisation (Zahra, 1984).

13

Trust
Trust refers to interpersonal acceptance and openness of expression (Zand, 1972).

Hypotheses

The major hypotheses to be tested are as follows:

The extent of budgetary participation among Norwegian managers is high.

Budget emphasis is negatively associated with job related tension/propensity
to create slack in the Norwegian high participatory environment.

Model One
Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension/propensity to
create slack through ( l) trust and (2) budgetary participation.

Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on job related tension/propensity
to create slack through trust.

Model Two
Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension/propensity to
create slack through (l) organisational commitment and (2) budgetary
participation.

Budgetary participation has ari indirect effect on job related tension/propensity
to create slack through organisational commitment.
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Method

A questionnaire translated from English to Norwegian was administered to three
functional heads from l 00 randomly selected manufacturing companies in Norway.
Path analysis was used to examine systematically the direct, indirect or spurious
effects of the hypothesised relationships.

Chapter outline and organisation

This thesis is organised as follows:

Chapter 2 surveys critically the relevant literature pertaining to relevant studies on
budget emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational commitment, as well as trust
and their effects on propensity to create slack or job related tension.

Chapter 3 examines the underlying theories and formulates the hypotheses. The
theories concerning the direct effects of budget emphasis/budgetary participation,
budgetary participation/trust, budgetary participation/organisational commitment are
first presented. This is followed by a discussion on the indirect effects of budget
emphasis/slack or job related tension, and budgetary participation/slack or job related
tension via trust and organisational commitment.

Chapter 4 discusses the research methods used to collect the data and the reasons for
the choice of nation, organisations and respondents. In addition, an outline and
justification of the instruments used to measure the variables are presented in this
chapter.
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Chapter 5 presents the results of the study. These include the response rate of the
questionnaire survey, the descriptive statistics of the variables measured, an
assessment of the reliability of the measurement instruments, and finally, the results of
the hypotheses tests.

Finally, chapter 6 provides a conclusion to the findings of this thesis, the limitations
inherent in this study and suggestions for future research in this area of management
accounting research.

16

CHAPTER2

Literature Review

Introduction

Over the past five decades, researchers have examined the effects of budgets on
subordinates' job related attitudes and performance. Empirical evidence suggests that a
high emphasis on budgets in evaluative style may have a negative impact on
subordinates' job related tension and increase subordinates' dysfunctional behaviour.
Job related tension may be defined as dissatisfaction, constant worrying about the job
situation and distrust with the evaluation system, whereas dysfunctional behaviour
may be defined as budgetary slack creation and decision-making according to the self
interest of the individual rather than the organisation (Argyris, 1952; Hofstede, 1968;
Lowe & Shaw, 1968; Schiff & Lewin, 1968; Onsi, 1973; Kenis, 1979).

In addition to studies concentrating on resolving the issue of ascertaining which
performance criteria the subordinates either perform better, experience higher job
satisfaction or reduced tension, or higher propensity to create slack, some studies have
also included variables not related to budget based performance criteria. These include
organisational commitment and trust. Following these studies, this thesis examines the
relationship between ( 1) budget emphasis, budgetary participation, trust, slack and job
related tension, and (2) budget emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational
commitment, slack and job related tension. As such the literature in these areas will be
reviewed critically to provide an insight into the work that has been undertaken in
these areas. Based on these insights, it may be possible to ascertain how further
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research should progress. This will provide the motivation and direction on how this
thesis can further extend and contribute to this area of research.

This chapter will thus review the relevant literature pertaining to the issues of this
study, and will include the following sections:
(i) Superior evaluative styles.
This section is reviewed because superior evaluative styles have consistently shown
by prior studies to have a significant impact on organisational commitment, budgetary
slack creation and job related tension.
(ii) Budgetary participation.

This section is reviewed because prior studies have shown participation to have both a
favourable and an unfavourable impact on job specific outcomes, such as job related
tension and budgetary slack creation.
(iii) Trust.
This section is reviewed because trust is a crucial variable in this thesis. Since this
thesis is motivated by the lack of management accounting studies involving trust, the
literature review comprises studies that may explain the importance of including trust
to studies on supervisory evaluative styles.
(iv) Organisational commitment.
This section is reviewed because of the recent recognition of the importance of
organisational commitment in organisational and management accounting research.
Since most of the existing literature involving organisational commitment is found in
organisational studies, this section comprises mostly prior studies stemming from the
organisational literature. However, the emphasis is given to those recent studies in
management accounting involving organisational commitment (also referred to in the
section of budgetary slack creation).
(v) Budgetary slack creation and propensity to create slack.
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Two dependent variables are examined in this thesis, namely propensity to create
slack and job related tension. As the literature on budgetary slack is quite extensive
and prior studies have found strong links between superior evaluative styles,
budgetary participation and organisational commitment on the one hand, and
budgetary slack creation on the other, budgetary slack will be reviewed extensively as
a separate section. The literature relating to job related tension is included in the other
sections.

Finally, the chapter will discuss the implications of the literature review and
summarise the issues to be examined in this study.

(i)

Studies on Superiors' Evaluative Style

As early as 1952, Argyris examined the effects of superiors' evaluative styles on
subordinates' behaviour. He has been regarded as the initial explorer, as he was the
first to report that in organisations where budget emphasis was high, subordinates
clearly engaged in dysfunctional behaviour. He interviewed both operating and
accounting personnel in four manufacturing companies to identify their feelings
towards the use of accounting measures (budgets) by superiors to evaluate
subordinates' performance. He found that subordinates felt that that budgets were used
by superiors as a pressure device, a motivating factor and a means of isolating and
improving problems. He reported that such subordinates' feelings were derived from
three main factors, ( 1) the propensity of supervisors to emphasise the need to meet the
budget, (2) the increasing of budget standards as soon as they were met, and (3) the
inflexible and uncompromising nature of the budget documents which failed to
disclose the real reasons for the budget variances. Consequently, there was higher
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tension, frustration, resentment, suspicion, fear and mistrust amongst subordinates
when superiors used budgetary information to evaluate their performance. (Argyris,
1952).

Argyris proposed budgetary participation as a possible moderating variable of
supervisory style. According to Briers & Hirst ( 1990), his study provided a milestone
in behavioural accounting research as "it went beyond simply examining alternative
uses of accounting information in performance evaluation. Importantly, it was a
comprehensive study, rich in theoretical, as well as empirical, content" (p. 376).

Argyris' (1952) findings were later supported by Hofstede (1968), who conducted a
study of six manufacturing plants. He found that high budget emphasis resulted in
lower job satisfaction, more stress and anxiety. Also, consistent with Argyris ( 1952),
he found the adverse effects led to dysfunctional behaviour amongst the subordinates,
such as absenteeism and interpersonal conflicts.

Other studies found similar results. Lowe & Shaw ( 1968) researched the sales
budgeting process in a retail chain of approximately 400 shops. They found that when
management used budgets to evaluate their subordinates' performance, the
subordinates (in this case the sales managers) took advantage of their positions and
manipulated accounting figures. In addition, they also found that, in some cases,
budgetary slack was created when superiors emphasised budgets as a means of
performance. Onsi (1973) looked further into the effects on budgetary slack. In a study
of 32 managers, he found that 80% of the managers were involved in slack creation
when there was evidence of high budget emphasis.

20

These studies are important as they provide the support for a relationship between
budget emphasis and job related tension and slack with budgetary participation and

-

trust as intervening variables. Basically, a high budget emphasis evaluative style
should be complemented by a high extent of budgetary participation, which reduces
mistrust and hence leads to lower job related tension and a lower propensity to create
slack.

Hopwood ( 1972) undertook the first systematic empirical study on the relationship
between the use of accounting data and dysfunctional behaviour. He examined cost
centre managers from a large Chicago manufacturing company. He related
dysfunctional behaviour to three different styles of performance evaluation.

The first is the Budget-Constrained (BC) style, where a high emphasis is placed

•

on the subordinates' ability to continually meet budget targets when evaluating
their performance.
•

The second is the Profit-Conscious (PC) style, which involves a more flexible
style of budget use. More specifically, the importance of the budgetary
information is retained, but one is also able to recognise its shortcomings.

•

The third, the Non-Accounting (NA) style, is a style where the accounting data
are not important for evaluating performance.

Hopwood found that under the Budget-Constrained style (high budget emphasis),
subordinates experienced higher job related tension, a poorer relationship with their
superiors, and were more inclined to engage in dysfunctional behaviour compared
with subordinates evaluated under the Profit-Conscious or Non-Accounting style.
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Since Hopwood did not systematically examine managerial performance in his study,
Otley (1978) extended Hopwood's research by examining the effects of alternative
evaluation styles on managerial performance. Following suggestions from Baulmer
(1971) and Bruns & Waterhouse (1975), Otley examined unit managers with
independent production units, which would better enable him to isolate the effects of
supervisory styles. Whilst he followed Hopwood's definitions of evaluative styles, his
findings did not support Hopwood's findings.

Odey's inability to support Hopwood's findings led to his suggestion that a high
budget emphasis style could improve managerial performance. He explained the
differences in the results by questioning the realism or accuracy of budgets. For
instance, he argued that actual performance is likely to be closer to budget when the
budget is set realistically, and superiors would emphasise budget standards for
performance evaluation only when the standards were perceived to be realistic.

Due to Hopwood's and Odey's contradicting results, other researchers extended the
research on budgetary control with emphasis on a contingent approach. Otley ( 1978)
suggested that other contingency variables such as the types of organisations, the size
of the firms, the economic environment, and the shared norms and values within the
organisation and within the society would better explain the effects of budgetary
control. Some of these factors were already examined by Hopwood ( 1973) and Hayes
( 1977), and their results suggested that as organisations were increasingly exposed to
the environment, the use of accounting information for evaluation purpose could not
capture adequately the performance of subordinates.

Hirst (1981) was the first to continue· the research based on Otley's study. Hirst built
on Otley's ( 1978) suggestion that task interdependence could explain the divergence
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between Hopwood's (1972) results and his results. Otley studied profit centres that
were independent of each other whereas Hopwood studied cost centres in an
integrated manufacturing company. As neither Otley nor Hopwood measured task
interdependence, Hirst included task uncertainty as a moderating variable. He argued
that subordinates may have no incentive to improve their performance when there is a
low (high) reliance on accounting performance measures in low (high) task
uncertainty situations.

Task uncertainty is defined as an individual's beliefs on the completeness of causeeffect knowledge of the task performance (Hirst 1981, p. 599). Hirst hypothesised that
a medium to high (medium to low) budget emphasis minimises dysfunctional
behaviour in situations of low (high) task uncertainty. This may explain Hopwood's
(1973) and Otley's (1978) contradicting results. It is probable that Hopwood may have
examined departments characterised by high task uncertainty whereas Otley may have
examined independent subunits characterised by low task uncertainty.

Hirst (1983) conducted an empirical study to test his hypothesis by surveying parttime students (who were full-time middle-level managers) from four universities in
Sydney. He found a positive (negative) relationship between job-related tension and
budget emphasis for high (low) task uncertainty situations. These results indicate that
a high reliance on incomplete accounting performance measures in high task
uncertainty situations increases disagreement about evaluation styles between
subordinates and superiors, which in turn, increases job-related tension.

Task uncertainty as a moderating variable was also tested by lmoisili (1985). He
included role stress as an intervening variable, in addition to dependent variables such
as performance and dysfunctional behaviour. However, he was unable to find any
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significant results. A possible explanation may be due to the hardship the sample
organisation was experiencing at the time of his research.

Govindarajan ( 1984) attempted to reconcile the conflicting results of Hopwood ( 1973)
and Otley ( 1978) by examining environment as a contingent variable. He based his
study on the proposition that organisational effectiveness depends upon the existence
of a match between organisational control and its environment. He suggested that
Hopwood's and Odey's results were characterised by different levels of environmental
uncertainty. He defined environmental uncertainty as the unpredictability in the
actions of the customers, suppliers, competitors and regulatory groups that comprise
the external environment of business units. Following Hirst's ( 1981) contingency
framework, he argued that a moderate to low (high) budget emphasis combined with
high (low) environmental uncertainty would lead to increased performance.

Govindarajan tested his hypotheses with a sample of 58 general managers from eight
Fortune 500 companies in America, and found that environmental uncertainty has a
significant moderating effect on the relationship between budget emphasis and
performance. He suggested that his findings could explain the differences in the
results of Hopwood and Otley, as it was possible that different degrees of
environmental uncertainty existed in their studies. He suggested that Otley's sample
could be operating under stable environmental conditions, whereas the interdependent
unit studies by Hopwood faced greater environmental uncertainty based on
Thompson's ( 1967) argument that environmental uncertainty increases when task
interdependence increases.
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Another variable that has been examined to bring further closure to the Hopwood
(l 973) and Otley (l 978) conflict is the role of technology. Brownell & Merchant

(1987) considered the role of technology by arguing that a high product
standardisation provides a greater opportunity to accurately identify cost/volume
relationships, which would in tum affect adjustments to the budget. Hence, the use of
flexible budgets for evaluation purposes is more appropriate than a similar use of
static budgets. Brownell & Merchant examined their proposition by studying 201
production managers in the electronics industry and found support for their
hypotheses.

(ii)

Studies on Budgetary Participation

With regard to the importance of budgetary participation, Brownell (1982) made an
important contribution to the resolution of the conflicting findings of Hopwood (1972)
and Otley (1978), when he examined the moderating effect of budgetary participation
on the relationship between budget emphasis and job performance. He explained
Hopwood and Otley's results with the principles of operant conditioning and balance
theory. He suggested that a high budget emphasis is appropriate when subordinates
have the opportunity to negotiate the criteria against which their performance is
assessed. In contrast, a low budget emphasis is appropriate when there is a low level
of participation. He tested his hypotheses with a sample of 48 cost-center managers in
a San Fransisco manufacturing company and found results that supported his
hypotheses.

Hirst (1987) and Dunk (1989) later replicated Brownell's (1982) study. Hirst ( 1987)
studied a property development firm and found no significant interaction between
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budget emphasis and participation. Dunk (1989) conducted a cross-sectional study of
26 companies and found that high (low) budgetary participation together with high
(low) budgetary emphasis reduces performance. Bottger & Hirst (l 988) who also
examined the impact of participation, found that participation caused a reduction in
job stress where budget emphasis is high but found no such effect where budget
emphasis is low, which is consistent with Hopwood's ( 1973) study.

Brownell & Hirst (1986) attempted to link the Brownell (1982) and Hirst (1983)
studies by examining the three-way interaction between budget emphasis, task
uncertainty and budgetary participation. They believed that Brownell's (1982) result
would hold in low task uncertainty situations but not in high task uncertainty
situations as participation in high task uncertainty situations is deemed necessary for
managers to enhance performance, regardless of the level of budget emphasis. Their
results support their hypotheses ~at compatible combinations of high (low)
participation and high (low) budget emphasis decrease job-related tension in low task
uncertainty situations. However, they were unable to find any significant results for
the dependent variable of performance. They suggested the possibility of crossnational differences (one Australian and one U.S.), or some other intervening
variables, which could have affected their results.

Brownell & Dunk (1991) concentrated on task difficulty when they re-examined
Brownell & Hirst's ( 1986) study. They suggested that task difficulty rather than task
uncertainty might be of importance in order to generalise Brownell & Dunk's ( 1986)
results. Task difficulty is defined as the ability to specify input/output relations, and
whether there is any standard procedure or manual for subordinates to follow in order
to successfully carry out a task. The other dimension, task variability, is considered to
be less important in order to generalise Brownell's ( 1982) study. For instance, in cases
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of high level of task variability, tasks could still be relatively simple and
straightforward. Thus, Brownell's ( 1982) results can be generalised across different

-

levels of task variability. Their results supported their proposition, that is, where task
difficulty is low, low (high) participation accompanied by low (high) budget emphasis
is associated with effective managerial performance. However, they found that when
task difficulty is high, high participation, regardless of the level of budget emphasis, is
associated with effective managerial performance.

Hwang ( 1989) and Harrison ( 1992) provided further insights into the study of
superiors' evaluative styles and budgetary participation by introducing national culture
as a contingent variable. Hwang ( 1989) studied the effect of power distance on the
relationship between budgetary participation and motivation. Harrison (1992)
examined the moderating effect of national cultures on the relationship between
budget emphasis and both job satisfaction and job-related tension. He conducted a
cross-cultural study to ascertain whether Brownell's ( 1982) results can be generalised
across nations with different cultures. He suggested that culture might influence the
perceived appropriateness of participation. He used Hofstede's (1980) cultural
dimensions when categorising nations according to what would most likely affect
participation. The cultural dimensions used were power distance and individualism.

Since Brownell's (1982) findings were based on a sample from the U.S., they were
expected to be generalised to nations similar to the U.S., in other words, nations with a
low power distance and high individualism, like for instance, Australia. However,
Harrison (1992) also expected Brownell's findings to be applicable to high power
distance and low individualism nations, like Singapore, because these nations like the
U.S., have one dimension (low · individualism) which favours

subordinates'

participation and another (high power distance) which is unfavourable to subordinates'
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participation. His results supported his hypothesis that the participation effects on the
relationship between budget emphasis and the dependent variables of job related
tension and job satisfaction, could be generalised across nations with high (low) power
distance and low (high) individualism. His results were also consistent with those of
Brownell (1982) and Brownell and Hirst (1986), that matching increasing level of
budget emphasis with increasing levels of participation would, in both nations
(Australia and Singapore), reduce job-related tension.

In addition, Harrison ( 1990, 1993) also examined the moderating personal variable of
authoritarianism to the relationship between budget emphasis and the dependent
variables job related tension and job satisfaction. He hypothesised that high budget
emphasis is preferable in high power distance nations as these nations place a high
reliance on accounting performance measures in evaluative styles. According to
Hofstede (1984) subordinates in high power distance nations are very dependent and
expect their superiors to behave autocratically and be non-consultative. Hence a
leadership style based on high budget emphasis would be desirable. The same would
apply to low individualism nations. In contrast, subordinates in low power distance
nations will prefer a low budget emphasis as the latter leadership style is categorised
by a non-representative leadership style in the evaluation process. Subordinates in a
low power distance nation emphasise the need to take part in decisions that concerns
them. Hence, a consultative leadership style is most appropriate. Harrison ( 1990,
1993) was able to support his hypotheses regarding the interaction between national
culture and budget emphasis on job related tension and job satisfaction. However, he
found no significant result for the three-way interactions between budget emphasis,
culture and personality affecting job satisfaction.
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Lau et al. (1995) used Harrison's (1992) framework for a study on national culture.
They extended Harrison's study by examining the three-way interaction between
budget emphasis, budget participation and task characteristics (task uncertainty and
task difficulty) affecting job-related tension and managerial performance. They
surveyed Singapore, and drew their sample from functional heads of manufacturing
companies. Their results gave further support to those of Brownell and Dunk ( 1991)
that high budgetary participation, irrespective oflevel of budget emphasis, in high task
difficulty situations will

improve managerial performance. Also, compatible

combinations of high budget emphasis and high participation were associated with
improved managerial performance in low task uncertainty situations. More
importantly, Lau, et al. (1995) found further evidence to support Harrison's (1992)
findings that the effect of budgetary participation on managerial performance can be
generalised between high (low) power distance and low (high) individualism nations.
Their results also indicate the possibility of generalising Harrison's results to
manufacturing industries and across functional areas.

Finally, a recent paper by Lau & Buckland (1999) also supports the generalisation of
research results on the effects of supervisory styles across cultures. The study was a
replication of the Lau et al. (1995) study. However, the research site was Norway, a
continental European nation with a Nordic culture. They found that the three-way
interaction between budget emphasis, budgetary participation and task difficulty has a
significant effect on job performance of Norwegian managers. In addition, when the
results were compared with those of Singapore (drawn from Lau et al.'s study), the
Norwegian managers, like the Singaporean managers, performed best when budget
emphasis and budgetary participation were both high in /ow task difficulty situations,
and performed worst when budget emphasis and budgetary participation were both
low. In high task difficulty situations, Norwegian managers performed best when
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budget emphasis was high, as opposed to Singaporean managers who performed best
when participation was high.

Studies on Trust

(iii)

Despite repeated mention of trust in the organisational and management literature,
relatively little theoretical explication or empirical examination of trust in relation to
supervisory styles and its effect on job outcomes is found in the management
accounting literature. However, the study by Ross ( 1994) is one excemption. He is the
first managerial accounting researcher to systematically examine trust. He argued that
trust may moderate the ~ffect Qf superior's evaluative style on the level of job related
-- -------------------·-

-

-

t~_!l!i_()_n. Specifically, he argued that trust may mediate the relationship b~tween
budget-constrained and the profit-conscious style and job related tension. However,
since the non-accounting performance evaluative style is ambiguous, subordinates will
experience anxiety irrespective of trust due to the ambiguity of an evaluative style
based on subjective criteria. Ross found that trust moderated the effects of the
performance evaluative styles on job related tension, but only for the budget
constrained and profit conscious styles.

Trust
has
b_~en widely recognised as an important condition to facilitate stable social
---·
·------·· -----~
--

•,

relationships. Merlinger (1956) and Read (1962) suggest that trust may increase an
organisation's internal communication, especially between superiors and subordinates.
It has also__b~~~-~~~~~~t~ _that trust is essential for effective problem solving in groups
(eg., Meadow et al., 1959; Parloff & Hand Ion, 1966), and that trust is a prerequisite
for effective and efficient organisations (eg., Simmons, 1981; Ouchi, 1981 ). In a study
on trust and managerial problem solving, Zand (1972) provided an extensive model of
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trust and its interaction with information flow, influence, and control. He isolated the
problem solving exercise by studying the relationship in a group setting amongst
managers of a large, international electronics company. The model conceptualises
trust by transforming one's inner trust into behaviour that is trusting through
------

---·

information, influence and control. The hypotheses derived from the model were
tested by a group exercise. Two groups were given identical factual information about
a difficult problem, and one group was briefed to expect trusting behaviour whilst the
other group was briefed to expect untrusting behaviour. Zand found that there were

I
'r

highly significant differences in the effectiveness between the high-trust and the lowtrust groups in the clarification of goals, the reality of information exchanged, the

',·,··.

~~ope of search for solutions, and the commitment of managers to implement

'

solutions. Consequently, trust appears to be a significant explanatory variable in

t

enhancing managerial problem solving.
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'
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With regard to the effect of trust on the performance of the individuals in the

~<

t
~

organisation, Robinson ( 1996) found that trust had a mediating effect on the

•

employee's contributions to the firm. With regard to the effects of budgetary slack

t

creation, Dunk ( 1997) reported that the relationship between participation and slack is

1,

~

r:

a rather complex one. His study indicated that personal factors are implicated in
influencing managerial behaviours (p. 660). Lau & Eggleton (1998) also mentioned
the notion of trust. They believed that subordinates will not create slack in order to not
jeopardise the level of trust their superiors have in them.

In conclusion, these studies suggest that trust
is an important factor affecting the
.._____ __
,

relationships between evaluation styles, participation and subordinates' behaviour. Yet
there seems to be a dearth of research studies on the effects of trust in management
accounting research. This gap in the accounting literature provides the motivation for
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this thesis to undertake a study on the intervening effect of trust on the relationship
between evaluative styles and subordinates' behaviour.

iv) Studies on Organisational Commitment

Organisational commitment refers to an employee's willingness to exert effort in the
organisation. With respect to studies concerning organisational commitment and its
effect on job specific outcomes, the literature is characterised by conflicting results.
For instance, Mowday et al. (1974) found that employees' attitudes towards their
organisations were related to job performance. They investigated the relationship
between performance (based on work units) and employee attitudes towards their
organisations among female clerical workers in a bank. They reported that in branches
rated high in performance, the workers experienced a higher level of attitudes toward
both the branch they were working for and the larger organisation they were part of,
whereas workers in low- and medium-performing branches had a lower level of
similar attitudes.

In contrast, Steers ( 1977) could not detect a relationship between organisational
commitment and performance. His results were inconclusive as he only found an
association in two out of possible five situations. In a study of junior-level and seniorlevel staff accountants, Ferris ( 1981) found mixed results for the relationship between
organisational

commitment

and

performance.

For the junior-level

sample,

performance was found to be influenced by a willingness to exert effort, whereas for
the senior-level sample, performance was found to be influenced by a desire to
maintain membership (p. 323). However, as both categories are part of the definition
of organisational commitment, it is possible to conclude that Ferris found relative
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strong support for a relationship between organisational commitment and
performance.

Another study by Welsch and LaVan (1981) indicates that organisational commitment
is also related to job satisfaction and communication in organisations. They examined
organisational commitment and its relationship to different variables, such as
demographic characteristics, job satisfaction, job characteristics, professional
behaviour and organisational climate.

In their study of 149 upper and middle

managers of a large Medical Center, they found organisational commitment to be
strongly related to job satisfaction (satisfaction with work and satisfaction with
promotion) as well as participation (when the organisational climate was perceived to
be participative). An important implication of their findings is that in order to increase
the level of commitment in the organisation, different strategies will need to be
evaluated, such as the various components of organisational climate, power,
teamwork, and role conflict and role ambiguity (p. 1087).

Jamal ( 1985) suggested that organisational commitment acts as a moderator between
job stress and job performance. He argued that individuals with different levels of
organisational commitment might perceive job stress differently. Since individuals
with low organisational commitment have only limited feelings of loyalty toward the
organisation, they may perform only at a marginal level. He found marginally
significant results to support his hypothesis.

A number of other studies involving organisational commitment have addressed the

question of which casual relationship exists between organisational commitment and a
number of other variables, such as job satisfaction. Job satisfaction has been reported
to be both an antecedent and a consequence of organisational commitment. Whilst
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Gregson ( 1992) found that job satisfaction is an antecedent to organisational
commitment, Poznanski & Bline (1997) found the opposite casual relationship, that

-

the level of organisational commitment experienced by a subordinate is directly
related to his/hers level of job satisfaction. The latter result is also in accordance with
the findings ofDeCotiis & Summers's (1987) study.

Only a few studies have considered the role of organisational commitment in research
on superiors' evaluative styles. Collins et al. (1995) examined the relationship between
evaluative styles and organisational commitment by surveying 344 non-supervisors in
a not-for-profit organisation. They found that management style based on budget data
was positively and directly related to organisational commitment, whereas the profitconscious and budget-constrained styles were only indirectly related to organisational
commitment.

The relationship between organisational commitment and participation was examined
by both Rhodes & Steers (1981) and by Nouri & Parker (1998). Rhodes & Steers
found that participation in decision making is significantly related to organisational
commitment in cooperatives, as these organisations will face a higher level of
commitment than conventional organisations. Nouri & Parker (1998) examined
organisational commitment, as well as budget adequacy, as intervening variables in
the budgetary participation - job performance relationship. They surveyed 139
American managers and supervisors from large multi-national corporations. They
found that budget participation affects job performance indirectly via budget adequacy
and organisational commitment.
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(v)

Studies on Budgetary Slack

The literature pertaining to the effects of superiors' evaluative styles and participation
on budgetary slack is quite extensive, and also quite equivocal. For instance, with
respect to budget emphasis, different results were obtained by Onsi (1973), Collins
(1978) and Merchant (1985). Onsi (1973) found a positive relationship between
budget emphasis and slack. He examined the proposed relationship by surveying 107
managers from 7 large-size, multinational U.S. corporations. His results indicated that
there is a significant relationship between managers' attitude toward an authoritarian
top management budgetary control system and budgetary slack. Cammann (1976)
reported similar findings as Onsi when he examined the effects of subordinates'
participation in decision making and job difficulty on their responses to different uses
of control systems by their superiors. He drew his sample from a large private utility,
where the respondents were managers at different levels of the organisation.
Specifically, Cammann investigated the effects of different styles of uses of control
systems on so called "defensive subordinate responses", which may be interpreted to
include budgetary slack creation. He found that the use of control systems (ie budget
emphasis) for reward allocation resulted in defensive subordinate responses (ie
budgetary slack creation).

Collins (1978) examined the relationship amongst several behavioural variables
affecting individual responses to budgets. Although he found evidence of budgetary
slack, he was not able to support Onsi's ( 1973) findings with regard to the relationship
between budget pressure and slack creation.

Merchant ( 1985) conducted a study to investigate how managers' propensity to create
slack is affected by the budgeting system. He hypothesised that propensity to create
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slack is positively related to the importance placed on meeting budget targets. His
findings showed that propensity to create slack increases "if a tight budget requires the
managers to make frequent tactical responses as not to incur budget overruns" (p.
207). Lal et al. (l 996) who replicated Merchant's (1985) study, were unable to find
any significant results. Based on these mixed results, later researchers examined the
effects of budgetary participation on the relationship between budget emphasis and
slack.

Empirical evidence regarding the effects of budgetary participation on slack is even
more inconsistent. Some researchers found the effect of budgetary participation
associated on slack to be positive (eg., Young, 1985; Lukka, 1988), whilst others
found it to be negative (eg., Onsi, 1973; Merchan~ 1985; Govindarajan, 1986). Young
(1985) tested the effects of participation on budgetary slack in an experimental study.
He found that a subordinate who participates builds in budgetary slack, and that slack
is attributable to the subordinate's risk preferences. He also included information
asymmetry in his study, but was unable to find any significant effect on slack.

Lukka (1988) provided an extensive theoretical framework in an attempt to gain a
wider understanding of the concept of budgeting biasing. The theoretical framework
was divided into two parts, the explanatory model of 'slack' at the individual level, and
the organisational model for 'slack'. The explanatory model suggested that three
different intentions, namely, resource intention, performance evaluation intention, and
motivation intention explain the reasons why budgetary biasing exists. The
organisational model suggested that "budgetary bias may have either an intensifying
or a dampening influence on conflicts in negotiations" (p. 298). His results provide
support for his theoretical framework. Amongst the implications of his findings was
the importance of the performance evaluation intention to explain the major part of
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budgetary slack creation. In addition, he found that the degree of participation was
positively related to the level of budgeting bias created.

The study by Dunk (1993) is important as he was the first to link budget emphasis,
budgetary participation and information asymmetry to resolve the issue of when
subordinates are likely to create slack. He hypothesised that when participation,
budget emphasis and information asymmetry were all high, slack would be high. He
drew his sample from a random selection of 118 managers from a total of 61
manufacturing companies. His results showed that the relation between participation
and slack is contingent upon budget emphasis and information asymmetry. Further,
his findings indicate surprisingly that when budget emphasis is high, participation
reduces slack. Due to his surprising results Lau & Eggleton (1998) provided and tested
an alternative theory to explain the conflicting results.

Lau & Eggleton ( 1998) theorised that subordinates in high budget emphasis-high
participation situations may not create slack because "they are likely to place greater
utility on the long run maintenance of participation privileges and the opportunities
they afford to both gain information from the superior and to influence the level of
budgetary targets" (p. 3). This theory was based on prior studies which focused on the
interaction between budget emphasis and budgetary participation (Brownell, 1982;
Brownell & Hirst, 1986; Brownell & Dunk, 1991; Harrison, 1992; Lau et al., 199 5).
Further, Lau & Eggleton ( 1998) suggested that subordinates in a high information
asymmetry situation may not create slack if they fear that slack creation may
undermine their superiors' trust in them. As a result, they hypothesised that the extent
to which subordinates find participation useful for their purpose will be dependent on
the three-way interaction between budget emphasis, participation and information
asymmetry. They tested their theory by examining the proposed three-way interaction
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on a cross-cultural sample of l 03 Australian and Singaporean managers, and found
support for their hypotheses.

These studies are important as they indicate that budget emphasis and participation are
related to slack creation. Additionally, these are suggestions that trust may be an
important variable in affecting the extent of slack creation. However, to date, the role
of trust on slack creation appears to been left untested despite the large number of
prior studies investigating slack. Hence, this omission provides the motivation for this
thesis to examine systematically the role of trust in slack creation.

Another variable, which may affect slack creation, is organisational commitment.
Most of the existing literature on budgetary slack creation is grounded in agency
theory propositions. Some researchers argue that participation gives the subordinate a
better opportunity to introduce slack into the budget (Young, 1985; Lukka, 1988;
Dunk, 1993 ). Nouri ( 1994) studied the effects of the motivational factors of
organisational commitment and job involvement to ascertain the level of a manager's
propensity to create slack. He posited that "managers who are highly committed to
organisational goals and values should have low levels of propensity to create
budgetary slack because they understand the dysfunctional impacts of budgetary slack
on the organisation" (p. 290). He examined his proposal on 139 managers from a large
multinational organisation. His results indicated that for managers with high
organisational commitment, job involvement was associated with decreased levels of
slack, whereas for managers with low organisational commitment, job involvement
was associated with an increased propensity to create slack.

In a later study, Nouri & Parker (1996) extended Nouri's (1994) study be examining
the interaction between budgetary participation and organisational commitment
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affecting budgetary slack. They posited that in a participatory budget, subordinates
with strong organisational commitment would use their budgetary influence to reduce

-

budgetary slack to benefit the organisation. In contrast, subordinates with low
organisational commitment would use they budgetary influence to increase slack to
secure favourable budget evaluations. Their results support these expectations. These
results indicate that there is considerable support to include organisational
commitment as an important variable in the study of subordinates' propensity to create
slack.
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Implications of Literature Review

The literature review provides a number of important insights into the relationships
between superior's evaluative styles and subordinates' behaviour, such as job related
tension and slack creation. It indicates that this research area has been the focus of
much research work, extending as far back to the early fifties. The continuing stream
of studies undertaken recently indicates that it is still an important and contemporary
area of research. This is not surprising as budget constitutes probably the most
important report of management accountants and the use of budget for performance
evaluation remains a crucial aspect of management accounting even in contemporary
highly competitive and complex operating environment.

The current interest in the use of nonfinancial performance indicators for performance
evaluation does not mean that studies on evaluative styles are no longer relevant. Note
that whilst nonfinancial performance indicators are important, they are not intended to
displace financial indicators. Rather, they are intended to complement the financial
performance indicators. Note that financial performance indicators remain as one of
the four key groups of performance indicators in the Balanced score card developed
by Kaplan & Norton (1992). Moreover, nonfinancial indicators as performance
evaluation criteria are not radically different from the superiors' evaluative styles that
were examined by those prior studies included in the literature review. The use of
nonfinancial indicators as performance indicators is in many ways the same as low
budget emphasis evaluative style, which emphasises nonaccounting or nonfinancial

performance indicators. This therefore means that many of the results of prior research
on superior's evaluative styles are applicable to contemporary organisations. This
suggests that there is a strong justification to continue to focus research effort and to
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extend on the area of supervisory evaluative styles so that a coherent theory can be
developed for this important management accounting area.

However, whilst much research effort had been expended in this area, the literature
review indicates that much remains to be done. There is clearly a need to undertake
further research to explain many of the conflicting, surprising and unexplained results
of prior studies. For instance, the literature review indicates that the effects of budget
emphasis on slack creation can be positive (Onsi, 1973; Cammann, 1976) or negative
(Merchant, 1985). Similarly, with respect to the effects of budgetary participation on
slack creation, they can be negative (Onsi, 1973; Cammann, 1976; Merchant, 1985),
insignificant (Collins, 1978) or positive (Young, 1985). Such results suggest the need
to re-examine the relationships among the variables. It is plausible that some of the
variables may be intervening rather than moderating variables. For instance, whilst
most prior studies have considered budget participation to be a moderating variable in
the relationships between budget emphasis and subordinates' behaviour, the results of
some prior studies (eg., Brownell & Dunk, 1991; Lau et al., 1995) indicates that it is
probable that budgetary participation may be an intervening variable. The theory for
this expectation will be discussed further in the next chapter. Hence, the literature
review indicates that the area of the impact of supervisory style on subordinates'
behaviour is relatively complex, involving a number of variables in complex
relationships that need to be investigated further.

Additionally, the literature review also indicated that whilst some variables have been
subjected to frequent investigation (eg., participation, task and environmental
uncertainty, national culture), other variables, which are likely to affect the
relationships between budget emphasis and subordinates' behavior have remained
largely untested. The t:terature review indicates that few prior studies have
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systematically investigated these relationships, particularly with respect to trust (Ross,
1994). More importantly, the literature indicates that few studies have attempted to

-

incorporate these variables into a single integrated model.

Hence, the literature review indicates the need to examine a number of issues. First,
whilst there seems to be a consistent pattern relating to the beneficial consequences of
a compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high participation, it is unclear
whether these results are generalisable to the Nordic cultural region where high
participation is the norm because of their low power distance culture and their
centralised and formalised industrial relations systems which emphasise democratic
work practices (Lau & Buckland, 1999). Second, it seems that there has been no
studies undertaken to investigate why a compatible combination of high budget
emphasis and high participation is associated with beneficial behavioural outcomes.
Hence, this gap in the literature needs to be addressed. Third, there is a need to
consider whether participation is an intervening instead of a moderating variable
(Brownell, 1982) in the relationships between budget emphasis and subordinates'
behaviour. Fourth, trust and organisational commitment should be included in the
relationships. Fifth, the issue of whether trust and organisational commitment are
moderating or intervening variables should also be investigated. Sixth, as the literature
review indicates that studies are often fragmented and variables which are related are
often not integrated into a single model, a model should be developed to integrate the
variables of budget emphasis, participation, trust, organisational commitment, job
related tension and propensity to create slack. Such a model is likely to provide better
insights into the complex relationships among these variables. It will also address a
concern of Chen hall & Brownell ( 1988) that there may be number of intervening
variables, apart from role ambiguity, which may affect the relationship between
budgetary participation and behavioural outcomes.
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The literature review also indicates that almost all studies undertaken in the area of
superiors' evaluative styles were undertaken in Anglo-American and Asian nations.

-

.

None were undertaken in continental Europe in general and the Scandinavian region in
particular. This suggests that some important regions were generally overlooked by
management accounting researchers. Hence, in spite of the vast bodies of evidence
built up in this research area, it remains unclear if any of this evidence is generalisable
to continental Europe and the Scandinavian region. Note that these regions are very
important, in terms of economic and social indicators and are among the most
industrialised and developed countries in the world. Hence, research evidence from
these regions is crucially needed to assist in the design and implementation of control
systems in these regions.

In conclusion, the literature suggests that the area of research pertaining to supervisory
evaluative styles and budgetary participation constitutes a very important and heavily
research area in management accounting. It suggests that this area of research is one of
the main and current management accounting research areas. Brownell & Dunk ( l 99 l,
p. 703) described this research area as "the only organised critical mass of empirical
research work in management accounting" and Lindsay & Ehrenberg (1993, p. 223)
described it as "one of the relatively few areas in management accounting where there
has been any sequence of repeated studies". Whilst conflicting results among these
studies do exist, there has nevertheless been an accumulation of a wide body of
research of evidence suggesting some general patterns on how these variables affect
subordinates' behaviour. Consequently, further research will help to contribute to the
understanding of this important area of management accounting.

43

Conclusion

The literature review provides important insights into the complex relationships
between superior's evaluative styles and subordinates' behaviour. These insights have
provided this thesis with not only the motivation to undertake further research in this
important area, but also the theories to develop the hypotheses to be tested. These
theories will be discussed further in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER3

Theoretical Development and Hypotheses Formulation

Introduction

This chapter presents the theoretical development of the hypotheses tested in this
thesis, along with the suggested models. It provides the theories linking the direct
effects and indirect effects of budget emphasis, budgetary participation, trust,
organisational commitment, slack creation and job related tension. Specifically, it will
discuss the relationships between budget emphasis/budgetary participation, budgetary
participation/trust,

budget

participation/organisational

emphasis/organisational
commitment,

trust/slack,

commitment,
trust/job

related

budgetary
tension,

organisational commitment/slack, organisational commitment/job related tension,
budget

emphasis/slack,

budget

emphasis/job

related

tension,

budgetary

participation/slack and budgetary participation/job related tension.

This thesis argues that the relationships between budget emphasis and slack/job
related tension may be indirect through budgetary participation and trust (see model
one in Fig. 3.1, page 56). This study will also examine the direct and indirect effects of
budget emphasis through the intervening variables, budgetary participation and
organisational commitment, on slack/job related tension (see model two in Fig. 3.2,
page 67).

Before the hypotheses are developed, it is necessary to discuss the concepts of the
variables examined. These are: (I) budget emphasis, (2) budgetary participation, (3)
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trust, (4) organisational commitment, (5) propensity to create slack, and (6) job related
tension.

Concept of Budget Emphasis

Budget emphasis is defined as the extent to which superiors rely on or emphasise prespecified budget targets when evaluating their subordinates' performance. A high
budget emphasis occurs when superiors do not deviate from preset budget targets
when evaluating their subordinates' performance. A low budget emphasis occurs
when superiors take into account other factors apart from budget targets when
assessing their subordinates' performance.

Hopwood (1972) classified superior evaluation styles into three categories:
1.

Budget Constrained Style (BC) is used when a superior evaluates his/hers
subordinates strictly according to short term budgetary goals.

2.

Profit Conscious Style (PC) describes an evaluation style that still uses
accounting data but in a moderated fashion. The accounting data are used in a
flexible manner and other criteria are also of importance.

3.

Nonaccounting Style (NA) is used when accounting data are unimportant in the
evaluation of subordinates' performance.

Several researchers have categorised the Budget Constrained Style and the Profit
Conscious Style as high budget emphasis and the Nonaccounting Style as low budget
emphasis (e.g. Brownell, 1982; Brownell and Hirst, 1986; Brownell & Dunk, 1991 ).
Hopwood tested these consequences of the three different evaluative styles. He found
that the budget constrained style (BC) resulted in greater stress, more hostility towards
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superiors and peers, a greater tendency to blame other managers for poor performance
outcomes and a tendency to charge departmental costs to other departments, as well as
a greater tendency to falsify budget data.

Concept of Budgetary Participation

Milani (1975, p. 274) defines participation as a concept "used to describe the extent to
which a subordinate is allowed to select his own courses of action". Brownell (1982)
similarly defined participation as an organisational process whereby individuals are
involved in, and have influence on, decisions that have direct effects on those
individuals (p. 126). It refers to the process in which individuals, on the basis of their
achievement of budgeted targets, are involved and have influence on the setting of
those budget targets.

Brownell (1982) undertook a study in order to bring closure to Hopwood's (1972) and
Otley's ( 1978) contradictory findings by incorporating budgetary participation as a
moderating variable. He suggested that there are no direct observable associations
between superior evaluative style and performance because the relationship is affected
by budgetary participation. He based his hypotheses on two theoretical paradigms,
operant conditioning and balance theory. Operant conditioning is concerned with the
level of participation when planning the budget. Cherrington & Cherrington (1973)
explained that rewards for budget related performance should be compatible with the
level of emphasis placed on budgets. The relationship between budget emphasis and
participation will operate in the same manner, as subordinates will accept high budget
emphasis only if they have been involved in setting the budget targets. Balance theory
explains the predicted consequences of either high budget emphasis matched with
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high budgetary participation or low budget emphasis matched with low budgetary
participation.

Brownell ( 1982) found a significant interaction between budgetary participation and
budget emphasis affecting managerial performance. Similarly, Bottger & Hirst (1988)
found that budgetary participation reduces job related tension when there is high
budget emphasis.

Concept of Trust

Gibb ( l 96 l) identifies trust as a condition that facilitates interpersonal acceptance and
------- ..

,.

--

--

...

openness of expression. Deutsch ( l 962) considers trusting behaviour as consisting of
"actions that (a) increase one's vulnerability, (b) to another whose behavior is not
(._

_____ _

under one's control, (c) in a situation in which the penalty (disutility) one suffers if the
other abuses that vulnerability is greater than the benefit (utility) one gains if the other
does not abuse the vulnerability" Cited in Zand ( l 972, p. 230).

In this thesis, trust is argued to be an important motivating factor that influences the
subordinates to work towards a better environment in their job situation. It may affect
the level of tension the subordinates feel, and the level of slack they create. It may be
related directly to the degree of subordinate's participation in the budgetary process.
Ouchi ( l 98 l) suggests that trust is the keyword when explaining the success of
Japanese management styles because the success stems from a willingness on the part
of the employees to sacrifice personal interests through the knowledge that such
sacrifices will always be repaid in the' future due to the managerial practices that foster
trust (p. 6).
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Concept of Organisational Commitment

Mowday et al. ( 1979)-define organisational commitment as ''the relative strength of an
individual's identification with and involvement in a particular organization." They
suggested that organisational commitment is characterised by three related factors:
1)

a strong belief in and acceptance of the organisation's goals and
values;

2)

a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the
organisation; and

3)

a strong desire to maintain membership in the organisation. (p. 226).

Another defintion offered by DeCotiis & Summers ( 1987) considers organisational
commitment as "the extent to which an individual accepts and internalizes the goals
and values of an organisation and views his or her organizational role in terms of its
contribution to those goals and values, apart from any personal instrumentalitis that
may attend his or her contribution" (p. 448).

The existing literature operates with different conceptualisations of organisational
commitment. Nevertheless, there seems to be a clear distinction between affective
commitment and continuance commitment (Meyer et al.,

1990). Affective

commitment encompasses the three characteristics given above, whereas continuance
commitment is concerned more with the costs associated with leaving the organisation
(Becker, 1960). To be consistent with prior literature (eg., Nouri & Parker, 1996), this
thesis employs the affective commitment conceptualisation of organisational
commitment.
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Concept of Slack Creation

Cyert & March (l 963) defined organisational slack as the difference between the total
resources available to the firm and the total necessary to maintain the organisation
coalition. Later researchers have defined slack in the context of a budgetary process.
Slack is regarded as part of the budgetary deviations between actual and standards
intentionally created by the subordinates (Onsi, 1973; Birnberg et al., 1983; Merchant,
1985; Young, 1985; Chow et al., 1988; Dunk, 1993). Lau & Eggelton (1998) define
slack as the "extent of intentional understatement of the subordinate's performance
capability built into the budget by the subordinate to make budgeted targets easier to
attain," (p. 5). This thesis employ the latter definition of slack creation.

Concept of Job Related Tension

Job related tension may be defined as "tension arising from psychologically stressful
circumstances in the job environment" (Kenis, 1979, p. 55). Jamal (1985) similarly
defines job stress as "an individual's reactions to the characteristics of the work
environment which appear threatening to the individual," (p. 410). These definitions
are adopted for job related tension in this thesis.
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Hypotheses Development

High participatory environment in the Norwegian society

Just as common culture can exist in a society comprising individuals who vary in
terms of personality, a common pattern of participation can occur in a certain cultural
environment. Hence, some researchers argue that some societal cultures may promote
a high participatory environment, whilst other societal cultures may promote a low
participatory environment (Hofstede, 1980; Brownell, 1982b). For instance, Harrison
( 1992) suggests that societies with a low (high) power distance culture are likely to
have high (low) participation among members of the societies. Lau & Buckland
( 1999) suggested that participatory environments are also likely to be influenced by
the political, social and economic norms of socities.

Power distance occurs because of human inequalities in areas such as prestige, wealth
and power, the extent of which is determined by the ways societies deal with such
inequalities. High power distance societies are characterised by the importance and
formalisation of such human inequalities, whereas low power distance societies
emphasise dominance and stratification (Hofstede, 1980). As low poser distance
cultures generally deemphasise the importance of hierarchy in society, but stress the
importance of equality and the sharing of power among members of the societies,
participation in the affairs of the societies by all their members is expected to be the
norm in low power distance cultures. Norway has a low power distance culture. In a
study undertaken by Hofstede ( 1980), a power distance score of 31 was reported for
Norway. A more recent study by Lau & Buckland (1999) reported an even lower score
of minus I0. This suggests that participation among members of the Norwegian
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society in the affairs of their groups and their organisations is likely to be high.
Harrison ( 1992) suggests that individualism can also affect participation. Norway was
reported to have an individualism score of 69 by both Hofstede ( 1980) and Lau &
Buckland ( 1999). This moderate level of individualism score is unlikely to affect the
high extent of participation in the Norwegian society brought about by its very low
power distance culture, particularly the very low power distance score of minus 10
reported recently by Lau & Buckland (1999). Hence, it is probable that the Norwegian
society is characterised by a high extent of participation, including budgetary
participation, among members of the society.

The high participatory environment in Norway is also supported by its very centralised
and formalised industrial relations systems which emphasisie democratic work
enviroment (Lau & Buckland, 1999). Norway has a very strong trade union
movement, led by the powerful Landsorganisasjonen. The Landsorganisasjonen is
very closely affiliated with the Norwegian Labour Party, the political party whcih has
dominated the government in Norway for the past few decades and has given Norway
a socialist government almost continuously since the 1930s. The consolidated position
shared by the Landsorganisasjonen and the Norwegian Labour Party has enable these
two powerful bodies to introduce many pro-labour policies and legislation which
enshrine the positions and power of the employees in their organisations. Hence, the
Norwegian industrial relations systems are very formalised, whereby, much of the
work environment is enshrined in legislations, such as the very comprehensive Work
Environment Act passed by the Norwegian parliament in 1977.

Not only is the Norwegian work environment very formalised, it is also very
democratic (Lau & Buckland, 1999). In a study of Norwegian and Swedish industrial
relations systems, Johansen ( 1985, p. 6) noted that "Norway and Sweden have
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developed a view of thechnology which is different from the orthodox capitalist view
of profit maximisation towards a democratised technology." (Emphasis added). He
further reported that since the 1960s, both Norway and Sweden have been involved
"in the first systematic national effort in the world to change and democratise the
quality of work life. These developments .... strengthened trade union participation in
technological change and more humanistic and democratic forms of work .... By the
1980s, Norway and Sweden have become leaders in developing innovative and

democratic approaches to the problems of ... work design: (emphasis added). Hence,
Norwegian employees participate and involve themselves in all aspects of their
organisations' affairs up to the highest organisational level. There are legislations
which provide employees with representation at their organisations' board level.
Norwegian organisations with more than 200 employees are also required by
legislation to set ut "Company Assemblies" with a third of their members elected by
the employees. The "Company Assemblies" are powerful bodies with authority to
cover most aspects of Norwegian working life (Johansen, 1985). Hence, it is possible
to conclude that the Norwegian work environment is likely to be characterised by very
high participatory environment, with employees enjoying a very high extent of
participation in all the affairs of their organisations, including budgetary participation.
Finally, as the Norwegian society is very homogeneous, in terms of ethnic
background, religion, language and egalitarianism, participation is not only high, but
also widespread among Norwegian managers. Based on the above discussion, the
following hypothesis is tested:

Ht

The extent of budgetary participation among Norwegian managers is
high.
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The effects of budget emphasis in high participatory environment

Prior studies suggest that matching budget emphasis with budgetary participation is
crucial before beneficial behavioural outcomes such as lower job related tension could
occur. Relying on operant conditioning and balance theory, Brownell (19 82a) argued
that a compatible match of high budget emphasis and high participation is needed to
achieve improved behavioural outcomes. Since a high budget emphasis evaluative
style links rewards to the achievement of budget targets, budget targest are therefore
important to the subordinates. Participation is therefore important to the subordinates,
possibly because participation improves subordinates' understanding of the budget
target setting process and allows them to incfluence the levels of their budget targets.
Brownell (1982a) found support for his expectation pertaining to managerial
performance. Similar results pertaining to the beneficial consequences of a compatible
match of budget emphasis and participation were found by a number of subsequent
studies although in varying circumstances. These include Brownell & Hirst ( 1986),
Brownell & Dunk (1991, Harrision (1992), Dunk (1993), Lau et al. (1995), Lau & Tan
( 1998), Lau & Eggleton ( 1998) and Lau & Buckland ( 1999). Such remarkable
similarities in the results provide support for the expectation that a high budget

emphasis evaluative style is likely to be associated with favourable behavioral
outcomes, such as reduced job related tension and reduced propensity to create slack,
and in a high participatory environment. Since it was previously hypothesised that the
Norwegian culture promotes a high participatory environment, a high budget emphasis
evaluative style in the high Norwegian participatory environment is likely to be
associated with low job related tension and a low propensity to create slack.

The following hypotheses are therefore tested:
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H2. l

Budget emphasis is negatively associated with job related tension in the
Norwegian high participatory environment.

H2.2

Budget emphasis is negatively associated with subordinates' propensity to
create slack in the Norwegian high participatory environment.
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Relationships between variables in Model One {Figure 3.1)

Model One

The following sections provide the theoretical justification for the relationships
between the variables examined in Model One (see Figure 3.1).

Budgetary
Participation

l
Budget
Emphasis

Trust

I~
H4_i/H4_2

~

Hui

H3-2
Hs.i/
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•

JRT/Slack
creation

H2.1/ H2.2

Fig. 3 .1 Model one
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(a) Budget emphasis and job related tension/propensity to create slack

Whilst prior studies have found remarkabley consistent results pertaining to the
beneficial behavioural consequences associated with a compatible combination of
high budget emphasis and high participation, there has been little systematic
investigation in the manner in which this combination is able to produce the desired
behavioural outcomes. This gap in the literature provide the motivation for this study
to systematically examine the intervening effects of omitted variables to explain why a
compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high participation could lead to
lower job related tension and propensity to create slack in a high participatory
environment.

Support for the existence of omitted variables is found in the results of two of the
earliest studies in this research area. Whilst Hopwood (1972) found a significant
relationship between performance evaluative styles and job related tension, Otley
(1978) was unable to find any significant results. Otley' s failure to find a significant
relationship between evaluative styles and job related tension strongly suggests that
evaluative style by itself may have no direct effect on subordinates' attitudes. Since a
significant finding was found in Hopwood's study, this significant finding is likely to
be an indirect effect through some omitted intervening variables. Moreover, since the
results ranges from significant (Hopwood's finding) to not significant (Otley's
finding), they suggest that the omitted vaiables have a full mediation (Baron & Kenny,
1986) on the relationship between evaluative styles and job related tension/propensity
to create slack. This thesis therefore proposes that there is no direct relationships
between budget emphasis and job related tension/propensity to create slack. Instead,
the relationships ae indirect via trust and participation. The theoretical support for this
expectation is provided below in sections (b), (c) and (d).
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(b) Budget emphasis and trust

The link between trust and budget emphasis was first explored by Ross (1994) who
found that budget emphasis interacted with trust to affect job related tension. He found
trust to be significant in moderating the effects of budget emphasis on job related
tension only with respect to the two evaluative styles (budget conscious and profit
constrained) which rely on accounting performance measures, but not with respect to
nonaccounting style.

This thesis proposes a positive relationship between budget emphasis and trust in the
Norwegian high participatory environment. According to Ross ( 1994 ), subordinates
are likely to be suspicious and apprehensive of a nonaccounting evaluative style. He
described such a style as difficult to interpret as "the criteria associated with the
nonaccounting performance evaluation style are somewhat subjective and therefore,
may well be ambiguous and difficult to measure" and are subject to "a superior's
biases and idiosyncrasies" (p. 630). He further suggested that subordinates "may
always have a nagging doubts as to the reasonableness of an evaluation based on
subjective criteria.... The managers may, therefore, feel a lack of control over their
ability to affect their evaluation". In contrast, evaluative style based on accounting
performance measures are likely to be much more acceptable to subordinates because
such criteria were described by Ross ( 1994) as much more "objective" and
"verifiable" than nonaccounting criteria. This means that nonaccounting evaluative
styles are likely to be associated with greater mistrust than accounting based
evaluative styles.

Empirically, Hopwood (1972, p. 173) found that trust was positively associated with
the two criteria of "meeting the budget" and "concern with costs", the two items he
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used to measure accounting based criteria. He suggested that ''this migh reflect the fact
that one purpose of a budget is to clearly set out the objectives for a cost centre. While
this certainly cannot be done with perfect accuracy, it is possible to carefully and
cautiously use the budget for this purpose and thereby add an important element of
structure and clarity to the job environment." He further suggested that "A

nonaccounting evaluation, in particular, might be made on the basis of rather vague
criteria: attitudes, the way the cost centre head handles his men, and effort. Whilst
such criteria are important, they are surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty. It is
difficulty to clearly specify what constitutes good and bad performance, and a
supervisor might find it difficulty to determine when improvement occurs. In these
circumstances, the budgetary systems offer one definite advantage. It attempts to
express the unit's objectives in a precise manner." (p. 174). Within the Norwegian
cultural environment, where high participation is common and widespread, a high
budget emphasis evaluative style in Norway is similar to a high budget emphasis and
high participation combination. As this is regareded as a desirable combination
(Brownell, 1982a), it is likely to be received favourably by Norwegain managers.

Hence, it is possible to conclude that in a high participatory environment such as
Norway, a high budget emphasis evaluative style is likely to be positively associated
with trust.
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(c) Trust and job related tension/propensity to create slack

Trust is likely to be an important variable affecting job related tension and propensity
to create slack. Zand (l 972, p. 230) defines trust as "actions that (a) increase one's
vulnerability, (b) to another whose behaviour is not under one's control, (c) in a
situation in which the penalty (disutility) one suffers if the other abuses that
vulnerability is greater than the benefit (utility) one gains if the other does not abuse
the vulnerability." Accordingly, a low trust environment is not conducive to open
communication. Subordinates learn to bottle up their feelings and not to express them
openly. Such a strained working environment is likely to lead to high job related
tension. In contrast, when high trust exists, subordinates and their superiors are more
willing to communicate with each other. They are also likely to be more willing to
express their feelings and air their concerns and grievances more openly.

Trust is generally associated with the acceptance of each other decisions. Trust is
crucial for the subordinates to accept their superiors' decision and choices, such as the
choice of evaluative styles. Trust will alleviate the consequences of choices. With
trust, superior choices are accepted and agreed, leading to low job related tension. In
contrast under low trust condition, suspicion is likely to lead to lack of agreement and
apprehensive of the superios'decisions and choices. This is likely to lead to high job
related tension. For instance, Ross suggested that "the level of job related tension that
resulted from performance evaluation can be reduced by the development of trust held
by subordinates for their superiors." (p. 630).

In summary, trust is a prerequisite for a number of activities, such as communication,
problem solving and decision making. In a high trust environment, all these activities
can be undertaken with less apprehension and conflict as trust generally facilitates
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such activities. With less conflict between subordinates and the superiors,
subordinates' job related tension is likely to be reduced. Trust leads to greater
acceptance of other views, greater consensus of opinions of the two parties and hence
less disagreement and conflict (Merlinger, 1965). It is therefore possible to conclude
that trust is negaitvely associated with job related tension. Similarly, in a high trust
environment, subordinates are less likely to create budgetary slack. As Zand (1972)
suggests,
"one who does not trust others will conceal or distort relevant information,
and avoid stating or will disguise facts, conclusions and feelings that he
believes will increase his exposure to others, so that the information he
provides will be low in accuracy, comprehensiveness, and timeliness; and
therefore have low congruence with reality" (p. 230).
Hence, it is also possible to conclude that trust is negatively associated with
subordinates' propensity to create slack.

The discussion in section (a) suggests that budget emphasis is negatively related to job
related tension/propensity to create slack in a high participatory environment.
However, section (b) indicates that budget emphasis may also be positively related to
trust. Trust, in turn, may be negatively related to job related tension/propensity to
create slack (see Section (c)). These discussions therefore support the existence of an
indirect effect of budget emphasis on job related tension/propensity to create slack
through trust. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are tested:

H3. l

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through trust.

H3.2

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through
trust.
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(d) Budget emphasis and participation

In addition to trust, it is plausable that budgetary participation may also be an
intervening variable in the relationship between budget emphasis and job related
tension. Prior studies suggest that high participation is needed to complement a high
budget emphasis evaluative style (Brownell, 1982a, Brownell & Hirst, 1986). A high
budget emphasis evaluative style places a heavy reliance on accounting performance
measures such as budget targets (Hirst, 1981, 1983) as criteria for the evaluation of
subordinates' performance. As performance evaluation is likely to be closely linked to
the reward systems, performance evaluation criteria are likely to be of interest and
concern to the subordinates since these criteria are likely to affect their rewards in
terms of remuneration, bonuses and promotions. Consequently, they are likely to want
to participate in the budget setting process so that they can understand how their
budget targets are determined and also to influence the levels of these budget targets.
Studies have also found that budgetary participation was associated with better
performance as budgetary participation led to greater subordiantes' acceptance of
budget targets, which in turn, led to greater subordinates' internalisation of budget
targets (Becker & Green, 1962). Since high participation is important to the
subordinates in a high budget emphasis situation, it is highly likely that organisations
using a high budget emphasis evaluative style will experience a greater willingness to
a participative budgeting setting process. In contrast, if a low budget emphasis
evaluative style is used, there would be less incentive for the subordinates to be overly
concerned with the budget setting process. Consequently, budgetary participation is
likely to be lower in a low budget emphasis situation than in a high budget emphasis
situation. This expectation was supported by the results of Lau & Buckland (1999),
who found a highly significant positive relationship between budget emphasis and
participation among Norwegian managers. The above discussion therefore suggests
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that a positive relationship exists between budget emphasis and budgetary
participation.
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(e) Budgetary participation and job related tension/propensity to create slack

Budgetary participation serves as a means of communication between the subordinates
and their superiors. It allows the subordinates to exchange and seek information from
their superiors, leading to a greater understanding of the budget setting process and
other organisational affairs. It also permits the subordinates to air their grievances, to
seek information for task completion (Brownell & Hirst, 1986), to ensure budget
adequacy (Nouri & Parker, 1998), by incorporating their input on the amount of
resources needed to sucessfully perform their tasks. Participation also permits the
subordinate to influence their budget targets. All these benefits of participation are
likely to lead to a greater extent of agreement on the evaluative style used, less
suspicion and apprehension and therefore less stress and anxiety. Consequently, it is
plausible that high participation will lead to lower job related tension/propensity to
create slack.

In summary, based on the discussion above, it is plausable that budget emphasis is
positively related to budgetary participation (see Section (d)). Budgetary participation,
in tum, is likely to be negatively related to job related tension/propensity to create
slack (see Section (e)). These relationships suggest that the effect of budget emphasis
on job related tension/propensity to create slack as discussed in Section (a) may be
indirect through participation. The following hypotheses are therefore tested:

H4. I

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through
budgetary participation.

H4.2

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through
budgetary participation.
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( f) Budgetary participation and trust

Budgetary participation is likely to promote a higher extent of trust between the
subordinates and their superiors in a number of ways. First, budgetary participation
opens up the budget target setting process to ghe subordinates' scrutiny. It makes the
process transparent, thereby lowering subordinates' fear, apprehension, suspicion and
mistrust of their superior's evaluative styles and ultimately their superiors. Related to
these, participation permits the subordinates to understand how their budget targets are
ascertained. Third, budgetary participation allows the subordinates to influence the
level of their budget targets, leading to more accurate and realistic targets.
Subordinates are more likely to trust the budget targets they are involved in setting
than targets that are imposed on them by others. Fourth, budgetary participation
provides the opportunity for the subordinates to communicate with their superiors, not
only on budget-related matters, but also on other issues of concern to them. Finally, as
the Norwegian society is generally highly receptive to high participation, high
budgetary participation would be consistent with the societal norm. In conclusion, it is
plausible that budgetary participation, which promotes an atmosphere of greater
transperency, open and frank communication and is consistent with the cultural norm,
is likely to be associated with a greater feeling of trust between Norwegian managers
and their superiors. This suggests a positive association between budgetary

participation and trust.

Note that it was previously discussed in Section (e) that budgetary participation is
likely to be negatively related to job related tension. Since Section (f) indicates that
budgetary participation is also likely to be positively related to trust, and trust, in tum,
may be negatively related to job related tension/propensity to create slack (see Section
(c)), it is possible to conclude that the effect of budgetary participation on job related
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tension/propensity to create slack may be mediated by the intervening effect of trust.
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are tested:

H5. l

Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on job related tension through
trust.

H5.2

Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack
through trust.
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Relationships between variables in Model Two {Figure 3.2)

Model Two

The following sections provide the theoretical justification for the relationships
between the variables examined in Model Two (see Figure 3 .2).

Budgetary

Participation

1
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Fig. 3 .2 Model two
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The relationship between budget emphasis and budgetary participation

The expected hypothesisd relationship between budget emphsis and budgetary
participation discussed for the previous model, model one (see Section d), will apply
to model two.

(g)

The

relationship

between

budgetary participation and organisational

commitment

This thesis proposes a positive relationship between budgetary participation and
organisational commitment for a number of reasons. First, budgetary participation
enables the subordinates to understand the budget setting process. It also enables the
subordinates to directly affect the budgets and/or budget setting process to their
organisation's benefit. It is plausable that a better understanding and higher
appreciation of the organisational goals will lead to a higher level of commitment by
the subordinates towards their organisations.

Additionally, as budgetary participation enables the subordinates to influence
decisions directly affecting them, it enhances their feeling of importance, of being
valued and appreciated by their organisations. Participation also improves the
relationship between the subordinates and the superior, as both parties have to make
an effort to communicate, and thereby understand each other. To sum up, participation
may generate more satisfied employees who may then feel more committed to their
organisations.
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The importance of participation in enhancing individuals' commitment to their
organisations is also argued by Hanson (1966) who suggests that subordinates'
participation in the budget setting process will give the subordinates a better
identification with both budget objectives and organisational goals than subordinates
who do not participate. Similarly, Ouchi (1981) points out that for those organisations
with employees experiencing high commitment, the decision-making process is
largely a participatory one. Other prior studies also support a relationship between
organisational commitment and participation. For instance, Angle & Perry (1981)
suggest that employees' contributions to the organisation can be in two general forms,
with participation as one of them. Another example of the importance of participation
in decision-making was found by Rhodes & Steers ( 1981 ), who hypothesised that
perceived participation in decision-making is greater for worker-owners in
cooperatives than for employees in conventional firms, as worker-owners are likely to
be more committed to their organisations than employees in conventional firms. This
suggests a relationship between participation and organisational commitment.

Welsch & LaVan (1981) and DeCotiis & Summers (1987) also report a positive link
between employee participation and organisational commitment. Welsch & LaVan
found that participation in the decision-making process and clear downward
communications were directly linked to cohesiveness, referred to the sense of
teamwork, which in tum affects organisational commitment "through the individual's
understanding of the organizations' goals and values and through his or her role
involvement." (p. 464 ).

Finally, a recent paper by Nouri & Parker (1998), where they tested both direct and
indirect links between budget participation, organisational commitment and job
performance provides further support for a significant relationship between budget
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participation and organisational commitment. Based on the above discussion, it is
p/ausable that there is a positive direct relationship between budgetary participation
and organisational commitment (see model two in Fig. 3.2).
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(h)

The relationship between organisational commitment and job related

tension/propensity to create slack

This thesis suggests that organisational commitment is likely to have an impact on
subordinates job related tension and propensity to create slack. Subordinates who feel
committed to their organisation are likely to identify themselves with the
organisation's goals and values, and may thus better appreciate and work towards
these goals at his/hers best effort. Since job related tension and propensity to create
slack are mainly associated with dysfunctional side effects, it is probable that strongly
committed subordinates are likely to have lower job related tension and propensity to
create slack.

This proposition is supported by Nouri (1994) who examined the relationship between
organisational commitment and job involvement and their effects on managers'
propensity to create slack. He argued that "managers who are highly committed to
organizational goals and values should have low levels of propensity to create
budgetary slack because they understand the dysfunctional impacts of budgetary slack
on the organisation" (p. 291). It is therefore proposed in this thesis that organisational
commitment and job related tension/propensity to create slack are negatively related.
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(i) The relationship between budget emphasis and organisational commitment

A positive relationship between budget emphasis and organisational commitment is
hypothesised in this thesis for a number of reasons. First, budget emphasis is
accounting based. As discussed previously, Hopwood ( 1972) identified three different
performance evaluative styles, budget constrained (BC), profit conscious (PC) and non
accounting (NA). The budget constrained and profit conscious styles are characterised
by a high reliance on accounting performance criteria. The non accounting
management styles allow for a more flexible use of a wider range of performance
criteria for longer-term objectives (Briers & Hirst, 1990). As an accounting based
evaluation criteria involves clarity and objectivity it is plausable that the subordinates
may be more satisfied with a performance evaluation style that contains no ambiguity.
In other words, they would appreciate a high budget emphasis evaluative style. When
the subordinates feel they are being evaluated with a clear and fair system they are
likely to be more committed to the organisation.

There is some support from prior literature that superiors' evaluative style is related to
organisational commitment. For instance, Hanson (1966) suggests that "the more
closely an individual identifies himself with budget goals, the more appropriate will be
his responses to the budget." (p. 241 ). As budgets reflect organisational goals,
identification with budget goals is also likely to increase the subordinates'
identification with organisational goals. Similarly, Collins et al. (1995) found in their
study of not-for-profit organisations that superiors' evaluative style was directly
related to organisational commitment.

Finally, budget emphasis is normally accompanied wth budgetary participation. By
allowing participation in the budgetary setting procedures the subordinates will be
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motivated to work harder to meet those goals. Also, the subordinates may feel that
their words and effort are being recognised and appreciated. It is therefore p/ausable
that budget emphasis will enhance subordinates' organisational commitment.
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Indirect effed on budget emphasis on job related tension/propensity to create slack
through organisational commitment

Based on the discussion in Section (a) (Budget emphasis and job related
tension/propensity to create slack), Section (i) (Budget emphasis and organisational
commitment) and Section (h) (Organisational commitment and job related
tension/propensity to create slack) the following hypotheses are tested:

H6. l

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through
organisational commitment.

H6.2

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through
organisational commitment.

Indirect effect of budget emphasis on job related tension/propensity to create slack
through budgetary participation

Based on the discussion in Section (a) (Budget emphasis and job related
tension/propensity to create slack), Section (d) (Budget emphasis and budgetary
participation), Section (g) (Budgetary participation and organisational commitment)
and Section (h) (Organisational commitment and job related tension/propensity to
create slack), the following hypotheses are tested:

H7. l

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through
budgetary participation.
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H7 .2

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through
budgetary participation.

Indirect effect of budgetary participation on job related tension/propensity to create
slack through organisational commitment

Based on the discussion in Section (e) (Budgetary participation and job related
tension/propensity to create slack), Section (g) (Budgetary participation and
organisational commitment) and Section (h) (Organisational commitment and job
related tension/propensity to create slack) it is plausable to conclude that budgetary
participation has an indirect effect on job related tension/propensity to create slack
through organisational commitment. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are tested:

HS. I

Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on job related tension through
organisational commitment.

H8.2

Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack
through organisational commitment.

Conclusion

A total of eight sets of hypotheses are developed in this chapter. The results of the
hypothesis tests will be reported in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER4

Methodology

Introduction

This chapter presents the methods used in this thesis. A description of the data
collection is provided followed by the justification for the selection of the nation,
organisations and respondents. Lastly, a description and justification for the
measurement instruments used to measure the variables in this thesis are presented.

Data collection

Data were collected by the use of a questionnaire, which was sent to 300 functional
heads from 150 manufacturing companies selected randomly from the manufacturing
industry in Norway. Since the measurement instruments adopted for this thesis are
written in English, and since English is not a widely spoken language in Norway, the
measurement instruments were translated into Norwegian.

The selection of a nation

The survey was based on the Norwegian manufacturing industry. Culturally Norway
fits into the same category as nations belonging to the Anglo-American block, for
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instance, Australia, U.K, and the U.S.A. with regard to the power distance and
individualism dimensions (Hofstede, 1984). It is clustered with the other two

-

Scandinavian countries, Denmark and Sweden, enabling the results of this thesis to be
generalisable to Scandinavia as a whole.

Selection of organisations

The selected organisations are manufacturing companies in Norway, as the use of
budgets is fairly common in such companies. These organisations (a total of 100) were
randomly selected from Kompass Norway (1998). Only organisations with a
minimum of one hundred employees were selected to ensure that only relatively large
organisations were selected. Large organisations were used as large organisations are
more likely to rely on formal rather than informal budgetary control systems.

Selection of respondents

Respondents were selected from the company's work functional units to ensure that
the respondents were responsible for an identifiable department of the organisation for
which budgets are set, whether in profit terms, sales volume, revenue or cost terms
(Harrison, 1992, p. l 10-111 ). Functional heads from three different functional areas
were selected to represent three different work units. The functional heads were
mostly department managers from . the functional areas of marketing, finance,
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personnel departments, and production. The names of the functional heads were
obtained from Kompass Norway 1998.

The administration of the questionnaires was carried out in June 1998. The selected
respondents were sent a questionnaire together with a covering letter explaining the
objectives of the research, and a prepaid addressed envelope. A follow up by
telephone to those respondents who had not replied was undertaken three weeks after
the date the questionnaires were mailed. Appendix A presents the covering letter to the
respondents.

Translation of questionnaire

Both the Norwegian and the English versions of the instruments used in this thesis are
presented in Appendix B. The process of translating the questionnaire from English to
Norwegian involved three seperate steps. First, the author of this thesis (who is a
Norwegian) translated the questionnaire from English to Norwegian. Second, a
Norwegian professor of management at an Australian university translated the
Norwegian version of the questionnaire back to English. The last step involved a
cross-check of the latter English version with the orginal English version of the
quesionnaire to ensure that the translation was accurately undertaken.
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Measurement instruments

-

The following describes and justifies the choice of instruments used for measuring the
independent variables of budget emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational
commitment and trust, and the dependent variables of propensity to create slack and
job related tension.

Budget emphasis
Budget emphasis was measured by Hopwood's ( 1972) instrument. His original
instruments contained the following items:

1. Co-operation with colleagues
2. Concern with costs
3. How well the subordinate gets along with the superior
4. Concern with quality
5. Meeting the budget
6. Attitude towards work and company
7. Ability to handle employees

Later researchers made some modifications to Hopwood's instrument. Brownell and
Hirst (1986) added three new items to the list, by dividing "attitude towards work and
company" into two items, and adding a new item "how well I cooperate with
individuals outside the firm". This modified version was used in this thesis.

Based on Brownell's ( l 982) comment that many of his respondents failed to complete
the questionnaire adequately when they were asked to rank the items, the rating form
instead of the ranking form was used in this study. The rating allows the evaluative
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styles to be measured as a continuum (Otley, 1978; Govindarajan, 1984; Brownell and
Dunk, 1991; Harrison, 1992).

The two accounting based items: "Concern with costs" and "Meeting the budget" were
used to measure budget emphasis. The item "Meeting the budget" was intended to be
linked to situations when a cost center head's performance is evaluated based on the
cost center head's ability to "continually meet the budget on a short term basis"
(Hopwood, 1972, p. 160) (emphasis added). The item "concern with costs" was
intended to measure the "unit's operations in relation to the long-term purpose of the
organization" (Hopwood, 1972, p. 160) (emphasis added). Harrison (1992, 1993)
modified Hopwood's item "Meeting the budget" to "My ability to meet budgeted
targets in the short run", and the item "Concern with costs" to "My long run concern
with cost and/or revenues." These were also adopted in this study.

A high combined score of these two items indicates high budget emphasis and a low
combined score indicates a low budget emphasis. The 10-item list is numbered A 1 to
A 10 in the questionnaire in Appendix B.

Budgetary participation
Budgetary participation was measured by Milani's (1975) instrument and are
numbered DI to D6 in Appendix B. A 7-point Likert scale was used. The scale is
additive as the participation score is obtained by adding the scores of all six items. The
scale has been tested and used extensively in a number of previous studies (eg.
Brownell, 1982, 1985; Brownell and Hirst, 1986; Brownell and Dunk, 1991; Harrison,
1992; Lau et al., 1995, 1997; Lau & Tan, 1998). Their results of the internal
consistency of the instrument have shown satisfactory Cronbach alpha values.
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Trust
Trust was measured by a four-item instrument developed by Zand (1972). As Zand
conducted his research based on interviews and case settings, the questions regarding
the evaluation of trust between a subordinate and a superior were set out in a
questionnaire form with a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to
"strongly agree". The questions include "You have learned from your experiences
during the past two years that you can trust the other members of top management",
and "You and the other top managers openly express your differences and your
feelings of encouragement or of disappointment." The questions are numbered C 1 to
C4 in Appendix B.

Organisational Commitment
The instrument developed by Mowday et al. (1979) to measure organisational
commitment was used. It is a nine-item short-form scale assessed on a seven-point
Likert scale. It includes items like, "I found that my values and the organisation's
values are very similar" and "I really care about the fate of this organisation." Prior
studies have reported satisfactory levels of reliability and validity for this scale (Price
& Muller, 1981; Blau, 1987; Nouri & Parker, 1996, 1998).

Propensity to create slack
There are two instruments to measure slack, namely, Dunk's (1993) four-item
instrument and Onsi's (1973) four-item instrument. The latter measures the
subordinate's propensity to create slack, which focuses more on the subordinate's
attitude towards slack creation.
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The measurement instrument developed by Onsi (1973) was adopted in this thesis for
a number of reasons. First, it has been widely used in prior studies with satisfactory

-

levels of internal reliability (e.g., Merchant, 1985, Nouri, 1994; Nouri & Parker,
1996; Lal et al., 1996, Lau & Eggleton, 1998). Second, the instrument also implicitly
measures subordinates' intention to create slack, which is more consistent with the
definition of slack adopted in this thesis. Moreover, the instrument developed by Dunk
(1993) does not distinguish between slack created by superiors and slack created by
the subordinates, nor does it measure the subordinate's intentions to create slack (Lau
& Eggleton, 1998). The questions pertaining to propensity to create slack are
numbered Hl-H4 in Appendix B.

Job Related Tension
Job-related tension is defined as tension arising from psychologically stressful

circumstances in the job environment. There is an instrument known as Job Related
Tension index developed by the Institute for Social Research at the University of
Michigan to measure this variable. This index comprises 15 questions with a 7-point
scale. Since tension is stress-related in the work environment, the questions are related
to the individual's feelings towards his/hers working environment. For instance,
respondents are asked if they feel that they have enough authority, responsibilities,
opportunities, openness towards colleagues, independence etc. The 7-point Likert
scale ranges from "Very seldom" to "Almost all the time" to express how often the
individual is bothered by work situations in the daily work routine.

A number of prior researchers have also used this job-related tension index, including
Hopwood (1972), Otley ( 1978), Bo~ger & Hirst ( 1988), Hirst ( 1983), Brownell &
Hirst ( 1986), Harrison ( 1992). The questions are numbered K 1-K 15 in Appendix B.
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Conclusion

The instruments for measuring the variables used in this thesis are included in
Appendix B. The instruments for all variables except for trust have been used
extensively in managerial accounting research. The next chapter will present the
results of the reliability and validity tests for these instruments.
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CHAPTERS

Results

Introduction

This chapter presents the results of this study. First, it presents the response rate of the
questionnaire survey and the demographic data of the respondents. Then the
descriptive statistics of the variables measured and an assessment of the internal
reliability of the instruments used. This is followed by the results of the factor analysis
for construct validity, tests for adequacy of the regression models used and a
correlation matrix for the independent and dependent variables. Lastly, the results of
the hypothesis tests are presented.

Response Rate

Three hundred questionnaires were mailed to respondents from 100 manufacturing
companies located in Norway. A total of 132 questionnaires were returned, yielding a
response rate of 44 %. Out of the 132 returned questionnaires, 12 responses were
excluded from the study as they failed to complete the questionnaire fully. This leaves
the study with 120 usable responses. The nonresponse test suggested by Oppenheim
( 1966) indicate that there were no significant differences between early and late
responses. Hence, nonresponse bias was not present.
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Demographic Data

-

The mean age of the respondents was 52.3. On average, the respondents had held their
current positions for 5.4 years. The number of years of experience in their present area
of responsibility averaged to 12.1 years. The mean number of employees in their areas
of responsibility was 185, and the mean number of employees in their companies was
1,205. In addition, the demographic data also indicate that the respondents were
generally highly educated, as 95% of the respondents had tertiary qualifications.

Factor Analysis for Construct Validity

To test the variables for construct validity, the factor analysis principle components
method was used. The method addresses the problem of analysing the structure of the
inter-relationship among a large number of variables by defining a set of common
underlying dimension (Hair, et al., 1995). The variables tested for construct validity
were budgetary participation, organisational commitment, trust, propensity to create
slack and job related tension. The following Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 present
the results of the factor analyses, which show the rotated factor matrix, the Eigenvalue
of each factor and the percentage of total variance explained.
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Table 5.l

Factor Anall'.sis of Buda=;etac: Partici(!ation

Items

Factor

Factor

1

2

What is the extent of your involvement in the setting of your
area ofresponsibility's budget?
2

0.616

0.356

0.727

-0.419

0.814

-0.344

0.733

0.373

What is the degree of importance of your contribution to the
budget?

6

0.610

What is the extent of your influence on the final budget for
your area of responsibility?

5

0.584

How frequently do you give your opinions to your superior
about the budget?

4

-0.362

What is the extent of the reasoning given by your superior for
revision to your budget?

3

0.729

How frequently are you asked for your opinions when the
budget is being set by your superior?

% of variance explained

49.69%

17.70%

Eigenvalue

2.981

1.062

As all the six items show satisfactory loadings, including item (2) (0.584) which also
loaded on second factor, in the first factor, the scores of all the six items were summed
and used as the overall score for budgetary participation.
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Table 5.2

Factor Amtlysis of Omanisatiomtl Commitment
Factor
1

Items

Factor

2

I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that
normally expected in order to help this organisation

0.546

-0.356

0.770

-0.174

0.187

0.823

0.735

0.286

organisation.

0.753

-0.180

6

I really care about the fate of this organisation.

0.538

-0.439

7

For me, this is the best of all possible

0.724

0.339

0.802

0.048

0.795

0.065

be successful.

2

I talk up this organisation to my friends as a great
organisation to work for.
I would accept almost any type of job assignment

3

in order to keep working for this organisation.
I find that my values and this organisation's

4

values are very similar.
I am proud to tell others that I am part of this

5

organisations for which to work.

8

This organisation really inspires the very best
in me in the way of job performance.

9

I am extremely glad that I chose this
organisation to work for over others I was
considering at the time I joined.

% of variance explained

45.79%
4.12

Eigenvalue

14.03%
1.26

One item (number 3) loads on a second factor. Hence, for this thesis, only the scores
of the eight items (excluding item 3) were summed and used as the overall score for
organisational commitment.

1

87

Table 5.3

Factor Analysis of Trust
Factor
Items

loadings

You have learned from your experience during the past two
years that you can trust the other members of top management.
2

You and the other top managers openly express your differences
and your feelings of encouragement or of disappointment.

3

0.840

0.862

You and the others share all relevant information and freely
explore ideas and feelings that may be in or out of your defined
responsibility.

4

0.849

The result has been a high level of give and take and mutual
confidence in each other's support and ability.

0.735

% of variance explained

67.8%

Eigenvalue

2.71

With respect to trust, all four items loaded satisfactory on a single factor. Hence all
four items were included in the measurement of trust.
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Table 5.4

Fa~tor Analysis of The Propensity to create Slack

Items

Factor

Factor

1

2

In good business times, my superior is willing to
accept a reasonable level of slack in my budget.

0.584

-0.547

0.647

-0.418

0.666

0.376

0.647

-0.418

Slack in the budget is good to do things that

2

cannot be officially approved.
To protect himself/herself, a responsibility centre

3

manager submits budgets that can safely be attained.
4

To be safe, a responsibility centre manager sets two
levels of budgets: one between himself/herself and
his/her subordinates, and another between
himself/herself and his/her superior ..

% of variance explained
Eigenvalue

36.71%
1.47

26.29%
1.05

All the items of the variable propensity to create slack have a satisfactory factor
loading in factor 1. Even though the reliability value (Cronbach alpha) is not
satisfactory (see Table 5.6), this instrument is used for a number of reasons. First, this
instrument developed by Onsi (1973), is a relatively well established instrument used
by almost all survey studies on slack (e.g. Merchant, 1985; Govindarajan, 1986;
Nouri, 1994; Nouri & Parker, 1994; Lal, Dunk & Smith, 1996; Lau & Eggleton,
1998). Second, all prior studies, except Posadas & Mia (1995), which used this
instrument had reported satisfactory reliability and validity. Third, the Cronbach alpha
of this study is not improved with the deletion of any item from this variable. Finally,
as stated by Hair, Anderson, Tathan & Black (1995, p. 388) "the comparison of two or
more factor model results has always been problematic". Many causes, such as the
sample size and choice of factor analysis techniques, could influence the results.
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Hence, the reliability of factor analysis results from any single analysis is always
questionable and not always dependable (Hair, Anderson, Tathan & Black, 1995, p.
.
405). Nevertheless, given the low Cronbach alpha, care should be exercised in

interpreting the results relating to this variable.

90

Table 5.5
Factor Analysis of Job related tension
Factor

2

3

4

0.684

0.224

-0.327

0.276

0.619

0.184

-0.435

0.279

0.642

0.225

0.033 -0.510

0.678

-0.507

0.007 -0.084

0.740

-0.349

-0.075

0.028

0.501

0.198

0.508

0.196

0.669

0.300

-0.123 -0.159

0.658

0.225

-0.062

0.166

0.340 -0.150

0.627

0.455

0.512

0.443

0.403 -0.296

0.717

0.248

-0.159

0.073

0.701

0.153

0.149

-0.131

Items

l

Feeling that you have too little authority to carry
out the responsibilities assigned to you.

2

Being unclear on just what the scope and
responsibilities of your job are.

3

Not knowing what opportunities for advancement of
promotion exist for you.

4

Feeling that you have too heavy a work load, one that
you can't possibly finish during an ordinary work day.

5

Thinking that you'll not be able to satisfy the conflicting
demands of various people over you.

6

Feeling that you are not fully qualified to handle your
job.

7

Not knowing what your superior thinks of you, how he
or she evaluates your performance.

8

The fact that you can't get information needed to carry
out your job.

9

Having to decide things that affect the lives of individuals,
people that you know.

IO Feeling that you may not be liked and accepted by the
people you work with.

11 Feeling unable to influence your immediate superior's
decisions and actions that affect you.

12 Not knowing just what the people you work with expect
of you.

13 Thinking that the amount of work you have to do may
interfere with how well it gets done.

0.768 -0.358

-O.i'03

0.106

0.680 -0.304

0.073

0.089

0.483 -0.490

0.018

-0.420

14 Feeling that you have to do things on the job that are
against your better judgement.

15 Feeling that your job tends to interfere with your
family life.
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% of variance explained

40.47

9.716

7.995

6.837

Eigenvalue

6.072

l .457

l .199

l .026

The factor analysis results on job related tension indicate four factors are extracted.
However, all items, with the excemption of item (9) loaded satisfactorily on Factor 1.
Hence, the scores of the fourteen items (excluding item 9) were summed and used as
the overall score for organisational commitment. Item number 15 was included in the
summation as the factor loadings of (0.483) is very close to 0.5.

2

Descriptive Statistics and Scale Reliability Measures

Table 5.6 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent
variables measured in this thesis. The table also includes an assessment of the internal
consistency of the measurements of the applicable variables.
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Table 5.6
Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach Alphas for both Independent and Dependent
Variables

Mean

Standard

Theoretical

Actual

Cronbach

Deviation

Range

Range

Alpha

Min Max

Min Max

11.367

1.878

2

14

5

14

36.420

4.630

6

42

14

42

0.79

Commitment

45.612

5.920

8

56

26

56

0.86

Trust

21.858

4.193

4

28

4

28

0.84

Slack

11.892

3.622

4

28

4

21

0.42

Job Related Tension

34.117

10.901

14

98

14

74

0.89

Budget Emphasis

n/a

Budgetary
Participation
Organisational

The Cronbach alpha for budgetary participation, organisational commitment, trust and
job related tension were 0.79, 0.86, 0.84, and 0.89 respectively, thus indicating high
internal consistency. In contrast, the Cronbach alpha for propensity to create slack was
relatively low at only 0.42. The instrument for propensity to create slack is Onsi's
(1973) four item instrument. Prior studies have reported satisfactory Cronbach alpha
statistics for this instrument, (eg., 0.7 for Merchant, 1985; 0.75 for Nouri, 1994; 0.75
for Nouri & Parker, 1996; 0.74 for Lal et al., 1996; 0.62 for Lau & Eggleton, 1998).
The low score obtained for this variable in this thesis may pose as a limitation to the
reported results.
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Test for Adequacy of Models

Regression models were used for testing the hypotheses of this thesis. Before
commencing on tests of hypotheses, it was important to test if the models chosen to
analyse the data were appropriate and valid. The analysis of the residuals would
determine the validity of the assumptions of the analytical models used. The
assumptions are that the underlying relationships between the dependent and
independent variables are approximately linear, and that the error terms are
independently and normally distributed with mean zero and variance cr (Montgomery
and Peck, 1982, p. 57).

The normal probability plot of the residuals is a common test for normality, which
compares the cumulative distribution of actual data values with the cumulative
distribution of a normal distribution (Hair, et al., 1995). Appendix D shows the,normal
probability plots of the residuals of the regression models used in this thesis. As the
normal probability plots show relatively straight lines for all models, it can be
concluded that the normality assumption was not violated in this study. These results
indicate that the linear regression models used in this thesis were adequate as the
assumptions of the models were satisfied by the data. Thus, the analysis of the
hypotheses using the regression models could be undertaken with confidence.
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Pearson Correlation Matrix for Independent and Dependent Variables

Table 5.7 shows the correlation coefficients using the Pearson pairwise correlations
between the independent variables of budget emphasis, budgetary participation,
organisational commitment, and trust, as well as the dependent variables of the
propensity to create slack and job related tension.

Table 5.7
Pearson Correlation Matrix for Independent and Dependent Variables
(standardised)

x,

X2

X3

X4

Xs

x,

Budget Emphasis

1.000

X2

Budgetary Participation

0.341.. 1.000

X3

Trust

0.399 .. 0.291.. 1.000

X4

Organisational Commitment

0.127

X5

Job Related Tension

-0.303 .. -0.375 .. -0.495 .. -0.477 .. 1.000

x6

Propensity to create slack

-0.204.

**

p < 0.01 (2-tailed)

*

p< 0.05 (2-tailed)

x6

0.316.. 0.449.. 1.000

-0.018

-0.288 .. -0.140

0.296 •• 1.000
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Hypotheses to be tested

The hypotheses formulated in chapter 3 are as follows:

H 1:

The extent of budgetary participation among Norwegian managers is high.

H2.1:

Budget emphasis is negatively associated with job related tension in the
Norwegian high participatory environment.

H2_2 :

Budget emphasis is negatively associated with subordinates' propensity to
create slack in the Norwegian high participatory environment.

Model One:

H3_1:

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through trust.

H3_2:

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through
trust.

Hu:

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through
budgetary participation.

H42 :

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through
budgetary participation.
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H5. 1:

Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on job related tension through
trust.

H5_2:

Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack
through trust.

Model Two:

8<;_ 1:

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through
organisational commitment.

H6 .2 :

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through
organisational commitment.

H1.1:

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through
budgetary participation.

H72 :

Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through
budgetary participation.

H8.1:

Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on job related tension through
organisational commitment.

Hs2:

Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack
through organisational commitment.
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Results for Hypothesis Hl

-

Before other hypotheses were tested, it was necessary to ascertain if the Norwegian
environment was associated with high participation as hypothesised in hypothesis Hl,
which states that the extent of budgetary participation among Norwegian manager is
high. Table 5.6 indicates that the theoretical range of participation is from 6 to 42. The
actual mean participation score is 36.42 out of a maximum of 42. This actual mean is

considerably higher than the theoretical mean of 24. The actual minimum score of 14
is also considerably higher than the theoretical minimum of 6.

Table 5.8 also presents the descriptive statistics of budgetary participation as measured
by the Milani instrument by some of the prior studis in this research area undertaken
in different countries. Note that mean participation score of 36.42 for Norway in this
study is much higher than those found in other countries, including the U.S.A.,
Singapore and Australia. The standard deviation of 4.63 for the Norwegian managers'
participation scores is also smaller than those of the other countries. Finally, the range
of 28 is also small relative to those of the other countries. Overall, the results in Tables
5.6 and 5.8 support the expectation that Norway has a high participatory environment.
Hypothesis H 1 is therefore supported.
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Table 5.8

Descriptive statistics of Participation scores with Milani's instrument

Studies

Mean

Std dev

Min

Max

Range

Norway

36.42

4.63

14

42

28

28.18

6.69

6

40

34

30.65

7.63

6

42

36

26.87

8.28

7

42

35

31.21

7.49

6

42

36

27.04

8.95

6

42

36

25.79

7.10

13

39

26

(Present study)
USA

(Nouri & Parker, 1998)
Singapore

(Lau et al., 1995)
Australia & Singapore

(Harrison, 1992)
Australia

(Brownell & Dunk, 1991)
Australia

(Brownell & Hirst, 1986)
Australia

(Brownell 1982a)
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Results for Hypotheses Hl.1 and Hl.2 (Budget emphasis and job related
tension/propensity to create slack)

The zero-order correlations between the variables examined in this thesis are
presented in Table 5.7. The results indicates that budget emphasis is significantly and
negatively associated with job related tension (r

=

-0.303; p<0.01), and with

propensity to create slack (r = -0.204; p<0.05). Hypothesis H2.1, which states that
budget emphasis is negatively related to job related tension, and hypothesis H2.2,
which states that budget emphasis is negatively associated with propensity to create
slack in the Norwegian high participatory environment, are both supported.

Path Analytical Model for Hypotheses H3 - HS

A path analytic technique was used to test the hypothesised relationships for
hypotheses H3 to HS. This technique allows the examination of the direct, indirect and
spurious effects (Duncan, 1966; Alwin & Hauser, 1975; Asher, 1983; Greene, 1977;
Lewis-Beck, l 980). The path models used in the analysis correspond to the theoretical
models in Fig. 3.1 and 3.2. These models show the links between the variables where
each variable has a path coefficient that measures the number of standard deviations of

j associated with a one standard deviations change in i. For example, the path
coefficient for the link between budget emphasis and budgetary participation indicates
the increase in budget emphasis, measured in the number of standard deviations,
associated with a one standard deviation increase in budgetary participation (Nouri &
Parker, 1998, p. 473).
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The values for path coefficients were estimated using regression and correlation
analysis, where the path coefficient is the standardised beta coefficient found by
.
regressing the outcome variable on the appropriate variables (Asher, 1983). The

following equations represent the structural models examined:

Model One {la) JRT and Model One {lb) PTCS

X2

= P21X1 +

P2aRa

(la)

X3

= P32X2 +

P31X1+ p3bllti

(2a)

X5

= Ps1X1

+ P52X2 + P53X3 + PscR:

(3a)

X(i

= P61X1

+ P62X2 +P63X3 + p6dR.i

(4a)

X1

~x!,~
==---------

X5IX(,

'!

'

,1

.j
j

!

lI
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Model Two (la) JRT and Model Two (lb) PTCS

X2

= P21X1 + P;aRa

(lb)

'4

= P42X2 + P41X1+ p4bRti

(2b)

Xs

= Ps1X1 + Ps2X2 + Ps4'4 + PscRc

(3b)

X6

= P61X1 + P62X2+P64'4 + p6dR!

(4b)

X2

x,0 x/~
where x 1 = budget emphasis
x2 = budgetary participation
X3

= trust

x.i

= organisational commitment

x 5 = job related tension
X6

= propensity to create slack

Pij = the standardised partial regression coefficients (path coefficient)
Ri = the standardised residuals
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Hypotheses H3.1 and H4.1 (Indirect effect of budget emphasis on job related
tension via trust and participation)

This section presents the results of the hypotheses tests for hypotheses 3.1 and 4.1 of
model 1 (a).

Trust and Job related tension (Model la)

BP
X2

I"'-

~1
BE
X1

•

TR
X3

"'-

~
~.I

•

JRT
X5

HJ.I

Fig. 5.1

Hypothesis H3.1 states that there is an indirect relationship between budget emphasis
and job related tension through trust, and hypothesis H4.1 states that there is an
indirect relationship between budget emphasis and job related tension through
participation. Table 5.9 presents the values of the path coefficients of the various
relationships and are calculated in accordance with the equations 1a, 2a and 3a for
Model 1 for Job Related Tension. The indirect effect of budget emphasis on job
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related tension consist of the following paths and are calculated based on the values of
the path coefficients in Table 5.9:

Path (1)

BE-BP-JRT

0.341 * -0.237

Path (2)

BE - BP - TR - JRT

0.341

Path (3)

BE-TR-JRT

0.339 * -0.401

Total indirect effect

* 0.175 * -0.401

= -0.081
= -0.024

= -0.136
= -0.241

Path ( 1) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via budgetary participation, which is
-0.81. Paths (2) and (3) indicate the indirect effect through trust, which is -0.16 (Nouri
& Parker, 1998). These results show that the relationship between budget emphasis
and job related tension comprises two effects. First, there is a direct effect of -0.062
(see Table 5.9). Second, there is an indirect effect of -0.241, which can be further
decomposed into the portion attributabe to participation (-0.081) and the portion
attributable to trust (-0.16). According to Bartol (1983, p.809), an indirect effect in
excess of 0.05 may be considered meaningful. Based on these results, hypotheses H3.l
and H4.1 are both supported.
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Table 5.9

Path Analysis Results (model la)

Dependent

Independent

variable

variables

coefficient

BP

BE

TR

JRT

Path

R2

t-value

p-value

0.341

3.945

0.001

0.117

BE

0.339

3.827

0.001

0.186

BP

0.175

1.973

0.051

BE

-0.062

-0.708

0.481

BP

-0.237

-2.840

0.005

TR

-0.401

-4.682

0.001

0.306
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Hypotheses HS.1 (Indirect effect of participation on job related tension via trust)

Hypothesis HS. I states that there is an indirect relationship between budgetary
participation and job related tension through trust. The indirect effect and the spurious
effect consist of the following paths and are computed based on the values of the path
coefficients in Table 5.9:

Path (1)

BP-TR-JRT

0.175 * -0.401

= -0.0701

Path (2)

BP- BE -JRT

0.341 * -0.062

= -0.0211

Path (3)

BP - BE - TR - JRT

0.341

* 0.339 * -0.401 = -0.0464
= -0.1376

Total indirect effect

Path (1) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via trust is -0.07. Paths (2) and (3)
indicate a spurious effect of -0.0675. As the indirect effect via trust is in excess of 0.05
(Bartol, 1983), hypothesis HS. l is supported.

Model one indicates that there is also an indirect relationship between budget
emphasis and trust through participation. The indirect effect of budget emphasis and
trust is calculated as follows:

Path (1)

BE-BP-TR

0.341 * 0.175

= 0.060

Table 5.10 presents a decomposition of the observed correlations for model l (a).
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Table 5.10

Decomposition of observed correlations (model lb)

Observed

Direct

Relations

correlation (a) effect (b)

BE/JRT

-0.303**

-0.062

BE/BP

+0.341**

+0.341 **

BP/TR

+0.291 **

+0.175*

BE/TR

+0.399**

+0.339**

TR/JRT

-0.495**

-0.401 **

BP/JRT

-0.375**

-0.237**

Indirect

Spurious

effect

effect

-0.241

+0.116
+0.060
-0.094
-0.070

-0.068

** p<0.01
* p<0.10
(a) from Table 5.7
(b) from Table 5.9
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Hypotheses H3.2 and H4.2 (Indirect effect of budget emphasis on propensity to
create slack via trust and participation)

This section presents the results of the hypotheses tests for hypotheses 3.2 and 4.2 of
model 1 (b).

Trust and Propensity to create slack (Model lb)

BP
X2

·~

~

1-------'l
BE
XJ

•

TR
X3

~
~-2

•

PTCS
Xo

H32

Fig. 5.2

Hypothesis H3 .2 states that there is an indirect relationship between budget emphasis
and propensity to create slack through trust, and hypothesis H4.2 states that there is an
indirect relationship between budget emphasis and propensity to create slack through
participation. Table 5.11 presents the values of the path coefficients of the various
relationships and are calculated in accordance with the equations 1a, 2a and 4a for
Model l(b) for Propensity to Create Slack. Similarly to model 1 (a) the indirect effect
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of budget emphasis on propensity to create slack consist of the following paths and are
calculated based on the values of the path coefficients in Table 5.11:

Path (I)

BE-BP-PTCS

0.341 * 0.104

Path (2)

BE- BP-TR- PTCS

0.341

Path (3)

BE - TR - PTCS

0.339 * -0.262

= 0.035

* 0.175 * -0.264 = -0.016

Total indirect effect

= -0.089

= -0.070

Path (1) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via budgetary participation, is 0.035.
Paths (2) and (3) indicate the indirect effect through trust, which is -0.105. These
results show that the relationship between budget emphasis and propensity to create
slack comprises two effects, which are the direct effect of-0.134 (see Table 5.11) and
the indirect effect of -0.070. The total indirect effect can be further decomposed into
the portion attributable to participation (0.035) and the portion attributable to trust (0. l 05). Recall, that according to Bartol (l 983, p. 809), an indirect effect in excess of
0.05 may be considered meaningful. Hence, hypothesis H3.2 (indirect effect less than
0.05) is not supported. However hypothesis H4.2 is supported.
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Table 5.11

Path Analysis Results (model lb)

Dependent

Independent

variable

variables

coefficient

BP

BE

TR

PTCS

Path

R2

t-value

p-value

0.341

3.945

0.001

0.117

BE

0.339

3.827

0.001

0.186

BP

0.175

1.973

0.051

BE

-0.134

-1.351

0.090

BP

0.104

1.097

0.138

TR

-0.262

-2.710

0.004

0.101
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Hypotheses H5.2 (Indirect effect of participation on propensity to create slack via
trust)

Hypothesis HS .2 states that there is an indirect relationship between budgetary
participation and propensity to create slack through trust. The indirect effect and the
spurious effect consist of the following paths and are computed based on the values of
the path coefficients in Table 5.11:

Path (1)

BP-TR-PTCS

0.175 * -0.262

= -0.0459

Path (2)

BP-BE-PTCS

0.341 * -0.134

= -0.0456

Path (3)

BP - BE - TR - PTCS

0.341

* 0.339 * -0.262 = -0.0303
= -0.1218

Total indirect effect

Path (1) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via trust is -0.0459. Paths (2) and (3)
indicate a spurious effect of -0.0759. The indirect effect via trust is just below the limit
of0.05 (Bartol, 1983). Hence hypothesis HS.2 is marginally supported.

Model l (b) also indicates that there is an indirect relationship between budget
emphasis and trust through participation. The indirect effect of budget emphasis and
trust is calculated as follows (which is identical to model 1 (a):

Path (1)

BE-BP-TR

0.341 * 0.175

= 0.060

Table 5.12 presents a decomposition of the observed correlations for model 1 (b).
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Table 5.12

Decomposition of observed correlations (model lb)

Observed

Direct

Relations

correlation (a) effect (b)

BE/PTCS

-0.204*

-0.134

BE/BP

+0.341 **

+0.341 **

BP/TR

+0.291 **

+0.175*

BE/TR

+0.399**

+0.339**

TR/PTCS

-0.288**

-0.262**

BP/PTCS

-0.018

+0.104*

Indirect

Spurious

effect

effect

-0.070

+0.116
+0.060
-0.026
-0.046

-0.076

** p<0.01
* p<0.10
(a) from Table 5.7
(b) from Table 5.10

112

Hypotheses H6.l and H7.l (Indirect effect of budget emphasis on job related
tension via organisational commitment and participation)

This section presents the results of the hypotheses tests for hypotheses 6.1 and 7 .1 of
model 2 (a).

Organisational commitment and Job related tension (Model la)

BP
X2

·~

~1
BE
x,

•
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}'4

~

~
H1.1

•

JRT
X5

~-1

Fig. 5.3

Hypothesis H6. l states that there is an indirect relationship between budget emphasis
and job related tension through organisational commitment, and hypothesis H7. l
states that there is an indirect relationship between budget emphasis and job related
tension through participation. Table 5.13 presents the values of the path coefficients of
the various relationships and are calculated in accordance with the equations 1b, 2b
and 3b for Model 2 {a) for Job Related Tension. Accordingly, the indirect effect of
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budget emphasis on job related tension consist of the following paths and are
calculated based on the values of the path coefficients in Table 5 .13:

Path (1)

BE- BP-JRT

0.341 * -0.186

Path (2)

BE - BP - OC - JRT

0.341

Path (3)

BE-OC -JRT

0.022 * -0.394

* 0.308 * -0.394

Total indirect effect

= -0.064
= -0.041
= -0.009

= -0.114

Path (I) shows that the indirect effect between budget emphasis and job related
tension is exclusively via budgetary participation, which is -0.64. Paths (2) and (3)
indicate the indirect effect through organisatinoal commitment, which is -0.050. These
results show that the relationship between budget emphasis and job related tension
comprises two effects. First, there is a direct effect of -0.189 (see Table 5.13). Second,
there is an indirect effect of -0.154, which can be further decomposed into the portion
attributabe to participation (-0.064) and the portion attributable to organisational
commitment (-0.050). As both indirect effects, (0.064) and (0.050) are in excess of
0.05, hypotheses H6. l and H7. I are both supported.
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Table 5.13

Path Analysis Results (model 2a)

Dependent

Independent

variable

variables

coefficient

BP

BE

oc
JRT

Path

t-value

p-value

0.341

3.945

0.001

0.117

BE

0.022

0.233

0.204

0.100

BP

0.308

3.303

0.000

BE

-0.189

-2.316

0.011

BP

-0.186

-2.178

0.016

oc

-0.394

-4.869

0.000

R2

0.315
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Hypotheses H8.1 (Indirect effect of participation on job related tension via
organisational commitment)

Hypothesis HS. I states that there is an indirect relationship between budgetary
participation and job related tension through organisational commitment. The indirect
effect and the spurious effect consist of the following paths and are computed based
on the values of the path coefficients in Table 5 .13:

Path (1)

BP-OC-JRT

0.308 * -0.394

= -0.121

Path (2)

BP -BE-JRT

0.341 * -0.189

= -0.065

Path (3)

BP - BE - OC - JRT

0.341

* 0.022 * -0.394 = -0.003
= -0.189

Total indirect effect

Path (I) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via budgetary participation, which is 0.121. Paths (2) and (3) indicate a spurious effect of -0.068. As the indirect effect via
participation is in excess of0.05 (Bartol, 1983), hypothesis HS.I is also supported.

Model 2 (a) indicates that there is also an indirect relationship between budget
emphasis and organisational commitment through participation. The indirect effect of
budget emphasis and organisational commitment is calculated as follows:

Path (1)

BE-BP-OC

0.341 * 0.308

= 0.105

Table 5.14 presents a decomposition of the observed correlations for model 2 (a).
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Table 5.14
Decomposition of observed correlations (model 2a)

Observed

Direct

Relations

correlation (a) effect (b)

BE/JRT

-0.303**

-0.189*

BE/BP

+0.341 **

+0.341 **

BP/OC

+0.316**

+0.308**

BE/OC

+0.127

+0.022*

OC/JRT

-0.477**

-0.394**

BP/JRT

-0.375**

-0.186**

Indirect

Spurious

effect

effect

-0.114

+0.008
-0.105
-0.083
-0.121

-0.068

** p<0.01
* p<0.10
(a) from Table 5.7
(b) from Table 5.9
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Hypotheses H6.2 and H7.2 (Indirect effect of budget emphasis on propensity to
create slack via organisational commitment and participation)

This section presents the results of the hypotheses tests for hypotheses 6.2 and 7.2 of
model 2 (b).

Trust and Propensity to create slack {Model lb)

BP
X2

BE
X1

Fig. 5.4

I

1

oc

I

X-4
H62

_J

--1

PTCS
"6

--

Hypothesis H6.2 states that there is an indirect relationship between budget emphasis
and propensity to create slack through organisational commitment, and hypothesis
H7 .2 states that there is an indirect relationship between budget emphasis and
propensity to create slack through participation. Table 5.15 presents the values of the
path coefficients of the various relationships and are calculated in accordance with the
equations I b, 2b and 3b for Model 2(b) for Propensity to Create Slack. Similarly to
model I (b) the indirect effect of budget emphasis on propensity to create slack consist
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of the following paths and are calculated based on the values of the path coefficients
in Table 5.15:

Path (1)

BE-BP-PTCS

0.341 * 0.103

Path (2)

BE- BP - OC - PTCS

0.341

Path (3)

BE- OC - PTCS

0.022 * -0.144

= 0.035

* 0.308 * -0.144 = -0.015

Total indirect effect

= -0.003

= 0.017

Path (1) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via budgetary participation, which is
0.035. Paths (2) and (3) indicate the indirect effect through organisational
commitment, which is -0.018. These results show that the relationship between budget
emphasis and propensity to create slack comprises two effects, which are the direct
effect of -0.221 (see Table 5.15) and the indirect effect of -'-0.017. The total indirect
effect can be further decomposed into the portion attributabe to participation (-0.03 5)
and the portion attributable to organisational commitment (-0.018). Since both indirect
effects are less than 0.05, neither H6.2 nor 7.2 are supported.
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TableS.15

Path Analysis Results (model 2b)

Dependent

Independent

variable

variables

coefficient

BP

BE

oc
PTCS

t-value

p-value

0.341

3.945

0.001

0.117

BE

0.022

0.233

0.408

0.100

BP

0.308

3.303

0.000

BE

-0.221

-2.309

0.012

BP

0.103

1.026

0.154

oc

-0.144

-1.522

0.065

Path

R2

0.063
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Hypotheses H8.2 (Indirect effect of participation on propensity to create slack via
organisational commitment)

Hypothesis H8.2 states that there is an indirect relationship between budgetary
participation and propensity to create slack through organisational commitment. The
indirect effect and the spurious effect consist of the following paths and are computed
based on the values of the path coefficients in Table 5.15:

Path (l)

BP-OC-PTCS

0.308 * -0.144

= -0.044

Path (2)

BP- BE-PTCS

0.341 * -0.22 l

= -0.076

Path (3)

BP - BE - OC - PTCS

0.341

* 0.022 * -0.144 = -0.001
= -0.121

Total indirect effect

Path (I) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via organisational commitment is 0.04. Paths (2) and (3) indicate a spurious effect of -0.077. As the indirect effect via
organisational commitment is lower than 0.05 (Bartol, 1983), hypothesis H8.2 is not
supported.

Model 2 (b) also indicates that there is an indirect relationship between budget
emphasis and organisational commitment through participation. The indirect effect of
budget emphasis and organisational commitment is calculated as follows:

Path (1)

BE- BP -OC

0.341 * 0.308

= 0.105

Table 5.16 presents a decomposition of the observed correlations for model 2 (b ).
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Table 5.16
Decomposition of observed correlations (model 2b)

Observed

Direct

Relations

correlation (a) effect (b)

BE/PTCS

-0.204*

-0.221 *

BE/BP

+0.341 **

+0.341 **

BP/OC

+0.316**

+0.308*

BE/OC

+0.127

+0.022*

OC/PTCS

-0.140

-0.144*

BP/PTCS

-0.018

+0.103*

Indirect

Spurious

effect

effect

+0.017

+0.008
+0.105
+0.004
-0.044

-0.077

** p<0.01
* p<0.10
(a) from Table 5.7
(b) from Table 5.10
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Conclusion

The analysis of the hypotheses was conducted by utilising path analysis. When one is
constructing structural models there are a few questions that need to be answered. For
instance, are the variables measured related, or in other words, is there a significant
non-zero correlation. If so, is this relationship spurious, that is, is the only relation
between the two variables based on their mutual dependence on another variable.
Finally, if the correlation is nonspurious, what is then the causal linkage between the
variables? (Heise, 1982). The benefit of such a structural model is the ability to break
down empirically observed correlations into parts that are due to different processes.
This is the strength of the models used in this thesis.

Table 5.17 presents the summarised results for this study.

Model One

Overall, the results offered support for some of the stated hypotheses. With regard to

model one (trust), the results showed that budget emphasis and budgetary
participation are directly related. Hence the literature on the beneficial effects of a
compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high participation is further
supported (eg., Brownell, 1982; Brownell & Hirst, 1986; Brownell & Dunk, 1991;
Lau & Eggleton, 1998). Trust was also found to be strongly related to job related
tension (see model la). Similarly, budgetary participation and job related tension were
also significantly related. No significant relationship between budget emphasis and job
related tension was also found. Both budgetary participation and trust were also found
to have an intervening effects on the relationship between budget emphasis and job
related tension.
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Trust was also found to be directly related to budgetary participation and propensity to
create slack (Model 1b ). However, no significant direct relationships were found
between (i) budget emphasis and propensity to create slack, and (ii) budgetary
participation and propensity to create slack. Hence, it is not possible to conclude that
budget emphasis or budgetary participation are negatively related to slack creation.
More importantly, this study found that budgetary participation and trust have
intervening effects on the relationship between supervisory evaluative styles and the
propensity to create slack.

Model two

Model two revealed that organisational commitment was related to budgetary
participation, which is supported by prior studies (e.g., Welsch & LaVan, 1981;
DeCotiis & Summers, 1987; Nouri & Parker, 1996, 1998). The findings also indicated
that organisational commitment is negatively related to propensity to create slack
(although only marginally) and job related tension. Model two showed that the
relationship between supervisory evaluative styles and job related tension is similarly
affected by the intervening effects of budgetary participation and organisational
commitment. However, with regard to model 2 (b), the indirect effect of budgetary
participation and organisational commitment on the relationship between budget
emphasis and propensity to create slack was negligible.

In conclusion, this study found that trust, and to a lesser extent, organisational
commitment have a mediating effect between budget emphasis and propensity to
create slack. However, both variables acted as mediating variables between the
relationships of budget emphasis, budgetary participation and job related tension.
Hence, we can conclude that trust · and organisational commitment are important

124

variables in explaining the relationship between superior evaluative styles and
subordinates behaviours.
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CHAPTER6

Discussion & Conclusions

Introduction

This thesis examined the relationships between the independent variables of budget
emphasis, the intervening variables of budgetary participation, organisational
commitment, and trust, and the dependent variables of propensity to create slack and
job related tension in the Norwegian environment. Using data from a Scandinavian
nation enabled the research on supervisory evaluative styles to be extended to a
relatively unexplored cultural region.

The motivations for this study are (i) to extend further research on supervisory
evaluative styles, and (ii) to extend the research in this area to a cultural region not
studied previously. Prior studies on culture have concentrated on high power
distance/low individualism nations in Asia versus low power distance/high
individualism nations in the Anglo-American block, where Australia has frequently
been proxied as a nation in this cultural block (e.g., Hwang, 1989; Harrison, 1991;
Harrison et al., 1996; Lau et al., 1995, 1997; Lau & Tan, 1998). European nations,
particularly Scandinavian countries such as Norway, have to date been barely explored
(Lau & Buckland, 1999).

A questionnaire was used on a sample of functional heads drawn from the Norwegian
manufacturing industry. The data were analysed by path analysis which enabled the
interpretation of the causal relationships among the different variables to be
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undertaken. Of special interest was the effect of trust and organisational commitment
on the relationship between budget emphasis, budgetary participation, on the one
hand, and slack or job related tension on the other.

Findings of the study

The major findings of this study are presented in Table 5.17 in chapter 5. They are as
follows:

(i)

Norway has a high participatory environment.

Model One

a) Job related tension

(i)

There is a significant positive direct relationship between budget emphasis
and budgetary participation, (p < 0.000).

(ii)

The relationships between (i) budget emphasis and job related tension is
indirect through a mediating effect of budgetary participation and trust (total
indirect effect: -0.241) and (ii) budgetary participation and job related tension
is also indirectly via trust (-0.138).

(iii)

The causal relationship between budgetary participation and job related
tension is both direct (-0.237, p< 0.005) and indirect (-0.07) via trust.
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b) Propensity to create slack

(iv)

-

The relationships between (i) budget emphasis and propensity to create slack
was indirect via budgetary participation and trust (total indirect effect: -0.070),
and (ii) budgetary participation and propensity to create slack was also
indirectly via trust (-0.123 ).

(v)

The relationship between budgetary participation and propensity to create
slack is both direct (0.104, p < 0.000) and indirect (-0.077) via trust.

Model Two

a) Job related tension

(vi)

The relationships between (i) budget emphasis and job related tension is
partially

moderated

by

budgetary

participation

and

organisational

commitment (total indirect effect: -0.114), and (ii) budgetary participation and
job related tension is mediated by organisational commitment (-0.189).

(vii)

The relationship between budgetary participation and job related tension is
both direct (-0.186) and indirect via organisational commitment and budgetary
participation (-0.121).
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b) Propensity to create slack

(viii)

-

No intervening effects of budgetary participation and organisational
commitment on the relationships between budget emphasis and the propensity
to create slack was found (0.017).

(ix)

Organisational commitment was found to have only a small intervening effect
on the relationship between budgetary participation and propensity to create
slack (-0.044).

Based on these results, the following conclusions may be made. First, as Norway has a
high participatory environment, it may be regarded as surrogate for high participation.
Second, consistent with the theory suggested by Brownell (1982a) and the results of a
number of prior studies including Brownell (1982a), a compatible combination of high
budget emphasis and high participation will lead to lower job related tension than a
mismatched combination of low budget emphasis and high participation combination.
Third, the direct effect of high budget emphasis and high participation (Norway) is
small. The effect is mainly indirect through trust and participation. Fourth, a
compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high participation will lead to a
higher level of trust between the subordinates and their superior than a mismatched
combination of low budget emphasis and high participation. Fifth, since trust is higher
between the subordinates and their superior in a high budget emphasis and high
participation situation, subordinates will experience lower job related tension. These
results, derived from an intervening model, therefore provide valuable insight which
helps to explain why a compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high
participation, found by a number of prior studies with the contingency model, can lead
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to better behavioural outcomes than other combinations of budget emphasis and
participation.

Discussion of results

With respect to the relationship between budget emphasis and budgetary participation,
a significant relationship was found. Hence, the findings of this study reinforce
Brownell's (1982) contention that a compatible mix of high budget emphasis and high
participation will have favourable outcomes. Prior studies have consistently supported
the expectation of beneficial consequences associated with compatible match of high
budget emphasis and high participation (eg., Brownell, 1982; Brownell & Hirst, 1986;
Brownell & Dunk, 1991; Harrison, 1992; Lau et al., 1995, Lau & Eggleton, 1998, Lau
& Buckland, 1999) With respect to the effect budget emphasis and participation have

on slack creation and job related tension, this thesis revealed that the relationships are
in most cases affected by the intervening variables trust and organisational
commitment. These findings are reinforced by the lack of significant relationships
between budget emphasis or budgetary participation on the propensity to create slack.
For instance, model 1 (b) found no direct link between budget emphasis and
propensity to create slack. These results are consistent with the findings of Collins
( 1978), who also found no significant relationship between budget pressure and the
extent of budgetary slack creation. Similarly, no link was found between budgetary
participation and slack creation. Prior findings on the effect of participation and slack
have been rather inconsistent. Although some studies found participation to have an
effect on slack, they were not consistent with respect to which direction that applies,
being either positive or negative (e.g., Onsi, 1973; Merchant, 1985; Young, 1985;
Govindarajan, 1986; Lukka, 1988). The findings therefore indicate that the
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relationship between superior evaluative styles and propensity to create slack involved
other intervening variables.

Further, it was also found that budgetary participation has a negative direct effect on
job related tension. These results are consitent with prior studies which have found
participation and job outcomes to be highly related (eg., Argyris, 1952; Becker &
Green, 1962; Hofstede, 1968; Locke & Schweiger, 1979; Mechant, 1981; Brownell,
1982). Whilst many of these studies have mostly examined the effect of participation
on either job performance or job satisfaction, and, only a few have examined the effect
of participation on job related tension (eg., Brownell & Hirst, 1986), the findings may
be inter-related. Jamal ( 1985) found job related tension to be associated with
managerial performance and Jaworski & Young (1992) found job related tension and
dysfunctional behavior to be related. Hence, the findings of this thesis are consistent
with many of these prior studies.

As mentioned, the relationships between either budget emphasis (and/or budgetary
participation) and slack creation and job related tension could be affected by other
intervening variables. One such variable investigated in this thesis was trust. Trust was
found to be positively and directly associated with budgetary participation, and
together with budgetary participation to have an intervening effect on the relationship
between budget emphasis and propensity to create slack, which is in accordance with
the theory developed in this thesis. It was argued in this thesis that a budget based
evaluative style (where targets are objective and verifiable) implemented in a high
participating environment, would increase the level of trust experienced by the
subordinates.
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This thesis also found that the effect of trust was negative on both propensity to create
slack and job related tension.

Moreover, the intervening effects of budgetary

participation and trust were even bigger than the direct effect of budget ·emphasis on
job related tension. Also, trust was found to have a considerable intervening effect on
the relationship between budgetary participation and both slack creation and job
related tension. In other words, trust has a strong beneficial impact on behavioural
outcomes in an organisation.

Both Dunk (1993) and Lau & Eggleton (1998) found a significant three-way
interaction among budget emphasis, participation and information asymmetry
affecting budgetary slack. Thus, this thesis provided an extension to these prior studies
by including trust as an intervening variable. As mentioned, it was found in this thesis
that trust has a partial mediation effect on both the relationships between budget
emphasis and slack, and budgetary participation and slack creation. It therefore
conforms to Read's ( 1962) suggestion that trust has a strong effect on the
communication relationships within an organisation, and to Lau & Eggleton's (1998)
suggestion that subordinates will not create slack in order to not jeopardise the level of
trust the superiors have in them. These results provide empirical support for the
suggestions of these prior studies. Ross (1994) also investigated the importance of
trust on the relationship between evaluative styles and job related tension. Hence, the
results of this thesis provided further support for his findings. The results of this thesis
indicate that participation also has a significant direct effect on job related tension.
This means that participation will reduce tension directly. However, trust will further
enhance this process.

This thesis also included an examination of organisational commitment as an
intervening variable shown in model two. The existence of a significant relationship
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between budgetary participation and organisational commitment found in this thesis
was in accordance with expectation. One important consequence of participation has
been found to be motivation (eg., Argyris, 1952; Becker & Green, 1962; Hotstede,
1968). Motivation was found to be an important characteristic of those individuals
who feel strongly committed to their organisation. These results are also consistent
with those of Nouri & Partker ( 1996) who also studied the link between participation
and organisational commitment. These findings also support the contention by Hanson
( 1966), that individuals who are involved in the creation of the budgets will better
identify themselves with both budget objectives and organisational goals. Also, the
results of this thesis are consistent with studies by Welsch & LaVan (1981) and
DeCotiis & Summers ( 1987), who also reported that employee participation and
organisational commitment are positively related.

Organisational commitment was found to be significant related to slack creation. This
thesis is therefore able to support the findings of Nouri & Parker ( 1996) who found a
link between organisational commitment and slack. With respect to the relationship
between organisational commitment and job related tension, the findings of this thesis
indicate a significant direct relationship. The literature is rather consistent with regard
to the effects of organisational commitment on job satisfaction (eg., Welsch & LaVan,
1981; Aranya et al., 1982; Norris & Niebuhr, 1983; Meixner & Bline, 1989;
Poznanski & Bine, 1997) or job performance (Nouri & Parker, 1988). Consequently, it
seems that the effect of organisational commitment on job satisfaction, performance
and job related tension is similar. Finally, it was found that organisational commitment
acted as an intervening variable between budgetary participation and slack creation
(see model 2b ). Budgetary participation and organisational commitment also acted as
intervening variables in the relationship between budget emphasis and job related
tension, and between budgetary participation and job related tension (see model 2a).
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Both trust and organisational commitment were found to be strongly linked to how
much tension a subordinate feels about his/hers job. Considering both variables acted
as intervening variables between budget emphasis/budgetary participation and
propensity to create slack/job related tension highlights the need for organisations to
emphasise their management policies to be aligned with the needs and understandings
of their subordinates.

Contributions of the Study

The major contributions of this study are the findings related to the effects of the
variables, trust and organisational commitment, in the area of supervisory evaluative
styles. Trust was found to be a crucial variable when examining the relationship
between budget emphasis and budgetary participation on the one hand, and their
effects on slack creation and job related tension on the other.

Trust was identified as a mediating variable of the relationship between (i) budget
emphasis and both slack creation and job related tension, and (ii) between budgetary
participation and both slack creation and job related tension. In addition, trust was also
found to be negatively related to both slack creation and job related tension. By

i

·;\

reporting that trust acts as an intervening variable, these results indicate the
importance of trust as the essential ingredient in every stable social and managerial
relationship. One implication of these findings is to create an awareness smong senior
managers that the adoption of strategies to enhance interpersonal trust within the
organisation may lead to beneficial .consequences such as reduced employees' job
related tension and slack creation. Along with trust, organisational commitment was
also found to be an important intervening variable of the relationship between
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budgetary participation and slack creation, and between budget emphasis and
budgetary participation and job related tension. Hence, this thesis has contributed to
the literature on both budgetary slack creation and job attitudes such as job related
tension.

In addition, as this thesis has focused on the Norwegian manufacturing industry, the
results provide further contributions to the knowledge about supervisory evaluative
styles and its implications for Norwegian managers. As only one prior study in the
area of supervisory evaluative style have been based on Norwegian managers (Lau &
Buckland, 1999), the findings of this thesis on trust and organisational commitment as
essential

mediating

variables

between

budget

emphasis

and

job

related

tension/budgetary slack, may provide managers in Norway with a better understanding
of these relationships, and consequently guide system designers in Norway on how to
design and implement an effective managerial control system.

Besides, according to Hofstede's ( 1984) cultural dimensions of power distance and
individualism, Norway is clustered with other Nordic European countries. This allows
the results of this thesis to be generalised to other Scandinavian countries, such as
Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Given the lack of research along this line in Norway
and Sweden ( see Hoegheim et al., 1989; Samuelsen, 1986; Jonsson, 1982, who
focused on budgetary control in government agencies only), an understanding of the
relationship between budget emphasis, participation, organisational commitment, and
trust may change managers' attitudes and supervisory styles and ultimately enhance
the productivity of organisations in this region. Also, since Norway was reported by
Hofstede ( 1980) to have similar level of power distance and individualism as nations
in the Anglo-American block, it may be possible to generalise the results of this thesis
to the Anglo-American block of nations.
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Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research in this Area

A number of limitations may have influenced the results of this thesis. First, with
regard to the reported results on propensity to create slack, the relative weak internal
reliability of the instrument used to measure the propensity to create slack may have
influenced the results. Although the results were relatively strong and supportive, the
Cronback alpha for the slack instrument was only 42 %. Second, this thesis regards
slack as the understatement of the subordinate's performance capability to make
budgeted targets easier to attain. Hence, this may restrict the generalisation of the
results of this thesis to downward biasing only, even though Lowe & Shaw (1968)
found that upward biasing could also occur (Lau & Eggleton, 1998).

Third, this thesis had drawn its sample from the functional heads of the manufacturing
industry. This may pose as another limitation to the generalisability of the results of
this thesis to other levels of management and also to other types of industry. Hence,
opportunities exist for testing these models in non-manufacturing industries, for
instance service industries and across different levels of management.

More research is also needed to provide support for the generalisation of the results of
this thesis to other Nordic countries. Two avenues are possible: (i) a comparison
between Norway or other Scandinavian countries (low power distance/middle to high
individualism) and nations proxied as high power distance/low individualism (South
East Asia), and (ii) a comparison between Norway and another Scandinavian country,
e.g. Sweden or Finland.

Finally, there may also be some ·problems that are inherently associated with
questionnaire survey methods. Future research may incorporate different methods for
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instance, longitudinal studies or in depth case studies. Longitudinal studies would
assist in the understanding of the interactions between variables on manager
behaviour, and in depth case studies have the advantage of enabling the researchers.to
observe the sensitive data.

Nevertheless, despite the listed limitations above, this thesis has attempted to evaluate
systematically the impact of trust on management control systems. It has continued to
advance an important area of management accounting research commencing from the
pioneer work by Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978) to subsequent contingency
studies. Further work in this line of research by evaluating systematically other
variables may help to advance this important area of management accounting research.
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Footnotes

l:

The exclusion of item 3 in the measurement of organisational commitment

made a slight difference to the reported results. Organisational commitment was found
to be marginally significant with propensity to create slack, whereas there was no
significance when the analysis was based on the full nine-item measure of
organisational commitment.

2:

The exclusion of item 9 in the measurement of job related tension made no

difference to the reported results.
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APPENDIX A

This appendix contains:
Copy of letter to manufacturing companies in Norway
(a)

the Norwegian, and

(b)

the English translation
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PRIVAT & KONFIDENSIELT

Navn
Tittel
Finna navn
Adresse
1. Juni 1998

VEDR0RENDE FORSKNINGSPROSJEKT
Jeg henvender meg til deg for din hjelp og samarbeid til et forskningsprosjekt
angaende budsjettmiljcp i Norge. Forksningsprosjektet er en del av min Master of
Business, Accounting utdannelse som jeg fullfcprer i Perth, Vest Australia.
J

Bedriften din har blitt valgt ut til a assistere meg med dette studiet som er for
forskningsfonnal. Prosjektet er bare basert pa norske data, og resultatet er denned
avhengig av tilstrekkelig antall utfylte skjema. Jeg cpnsker a meddele at all
infonnasjon vil bli behandlet konfidensielt og bare oppsummerte resultater vii bli
rapportert. En kopi av de oppsummerte resultater vil bli sent til deg etter anmodning.
Jeg er veldig takknemlig hvis du tar deg tid til a fylle ut dette spcprsmalsskjema. Det
skulle ikke ta mer enn ca. 20 minutter. En frankert og adressert svarskonvolutt er
vedlagt til din fordel.
Hvis du har noen spcprsmal angaende spcprsmalsskjemaet, kan du kontakte meg
direkte i Perth pa telefonnummer (
ellers er jeg i Haugesund fra den 12.
juni pa telefonnummer
Tusen takk for ditt samarbeid ogjeg ser fram til et snarlig svar.
Svarfristen er satt til l. juli d.a.

Med hilsen

Christin Selsaas Buckland
Masterstudent
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PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL
Date
Name of Manager
Job Title
Company Name
Address
Western Australia

Dear Sir/Madam,

Re: RESEARCH PROJECT
I am wntmg to seek your co-operation and assistance in a research project on
budgetary environment in Norway. The research is part of my Master of Business,
Accounting degree I am completing in Perth, Western Australia.ficer in charge of a
particular function such as production, marketing, sales, administration, personnel,
accounting and other such functions.
The research project is based entirely on Norwegian data. Therefore in order to obtain
meaningful results a high response rate is acquired. I am therefore appealing to you to
assist me so that the body of knowledge on Norwegian companies could be expanded.
I would be most happy to share the summarised results of this project with you.
You are kindly requested to assist in this study which is purely for research purposes. I
wish to assure you that all the information provided will be treated with strictest
confidence and only summarised results will be reported. A copy of the summarised
results will be sent to you if you request it.
I would be most grateful if you could complete this questionnaire. This should not
take more than twenty minutes of your time. A self-addressed prepaid envelope is
enclosed for your convenience.
If you have any queries with the questionnaire, kindly contact Christin Buckland at
in Perth, or at
in Haugesund after 12 June.
Thank you very much for your kind cooperation and assistance and hoping for an
early response from you. Without your help, this research project would not be
possible.
Yours sincerely,

Christin S. Buckland
Research Scholar
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APPENDIXB

This appendix contains:

(i)

A copy of the Norwegian questionnaire

(ii)

A copy of the English questionnaire
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EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY
PERTH WESTERN AUSTRALIA
FACULTY OF BUSINESS
SP0RSMALSSKJEMA OM BUDSJETTERINGS MILJ0

Svarene vii bli behandlet konfidensielt. Ingen i din organisasjon vii ha tilgang til ditt
spersmAlsskjema.

Ja

Er budsjetter brukt i din organisasjon?

Nei

D

Hvis svaret ditt er "Nei",vennligst ikkefyll ut resten av skjemaet. Vennligst send skjemaet ti/
meg i den vedlagte

konvolutten snarest mulig.
Hvis svaret er "Ja", vennligstfyll ut resten av skjemaet.

1.

Nar din overordnede (din nrermeste sjet) evaluerer din utferelse, hvor mye tror du at
ban eller hon vektlegger de felgende faktorer? Vennligst svar ved a merke av et
nummer fra 1 til 7 basert pa felgende skala for hvert punkt nevnt nedenfor.
l.
2.
3.
4.

Ofte av betydning
Vanligvis av betydning
Alltid av betydning

5.
6.
7.

Aldri av betydning
Sjelden av betydning
Av og til av betydning
Noen ganger av betydning

Aldri av
betydning

Hvor godt jeg samarbeider med mine medarbeidere. 1

Alltid av
betydning

2

3

4

5

6

7

Al

Min evne ti! a holde meg innenfor
pa kort sikt.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

A2

Hvor godt jeg forholder meg ti! mine overordnede.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

A3

Hvor mye innsats jeg gir pa jobben.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

A4

Hvor opptattjeg er av kvaliteter.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

A5

og/eller inntekter.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

A6

Min holdning til arbeid mitt.

l

2

3

4

5

6

·7

A7

Min evne til a takle arbeidsmengden min.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

AS

Min holdning til organisasjonen.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

A9

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

AlO

Min langtidsbekymring for kostnader

Hvor godt jeg samarbeider med individer utenfor
organisasjonen (f. eks. kunder).
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2.

Indiker i hvilken grad hvert av de felgende spersmal om forholdet mellom deg og
din overordnede du er enig i. Vennligst svar ved a merke av et nummer fra 1 til 5
basert pa felgend':. skala for hvert punkt.

l.

2.
3.

I veldig stor grad
I stor grad
Ti! noen grad

4.
5.

Ti! liten grad
Ti! veldig liten grad

Ti! en stor
grad

Ti! en liten
grad

Benytter din overordnede seg av dine fordeler av muligheter
som oppstar for a fremme dine interesser ved hans/hennes
handlinger og beslutninger?

2

3

4

5 Bl

Hvor fri foler du deg ti! a diskutere med din overordnede
de problemer og vanskeligheter du bar i ditt arbeid uten a
risikere din stilling eller a ha "det i mot" deg senere?

2

3

4

5 B2

Hvor sikker foler du at din overordnede holder deg cerlig og
holdent informert om saker som kanskje opptar deg?

2

3

4

5 B3

Noen ganger ma overordnede ta beslutninger som ser ut for a
vcere imot deres underordnedes interesser. Nar dette bender deg
som en underordnede, hvor mye ti!lit har du ti! at din overordnedes beslutninger er forsvarlige ved andre vurderinger?

2

3

4

5 B4

3.

l

Vennligst indiker i hvilken grad du er enig eller uenig med f01gende uttalelser.
Vennligst svar ved a merke av et nummer fra 1 til 5 basert pa f01lgende skala for
hvert punkt:

l.
2.

3.
4.

Svcert uenig
Moderat uenig
Lite uenig
Verken uenig eller enig

5.
6.
7.

';

~

I

Lite enig
Moderat enig
Svcert enig

~

i

I

Svcert uenig

i

Svcert enig

f

I
~

Du har !cert fra dine opplevelser fra de to siste
arene at du kan stole pa de andre medlemmene
av toppledelsen.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Cl

Du og de andre ledere uttaler fritt deres ulikheter
og folelser av modighet eller av skuffelser.

2

3

4

5

6

7

C2

Du og de andre ledere deler all relevant informasjon
og utveksler i apenhet og folelser som kanskje er i
eller utenfor deres definerte ansvarsomrade.

2

3

4

5

6

7

C3

Resultater oppnas ved et heyt niva av a ta og gi og
gjensidig tillit ti! hver enkeltes st0tte og evne.

2

3

4

5

6

7

C4
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De f0lgende situasjonene kan bli brukt til a beskrive din rolle i utarbeidelse av
budsjettet for ditt anvarsomrade. Vennligst svar ved a merke av et nummer fra
1 til 7 basert J!_a skalaen for hvert punkt.

4.

Hvor engasjert er du i a sette opp ditt budsjett ansvarsomrade?
Jeg er engasjert i:
Noe av budsjettet
Hele budsjettet
l
2
3
4
6
7
5

Dl

I bvilken grad bar din overordnede gitt begrunnelse for revisjon til ditt budsjett.
lngen begrunnelse
Omfattende begrunnelse
I
2
3
4
5
6
7

D2

Hvor ofte gir du din mening om budsjettet ti! din overordnede?
Aldri
Veldig ofte
l
2
3
4
5
6
7

D3

Hvor mye innflytelse bar du i det endelige budsjettet i ditt ansvarsommrade?
lngen innflytelse
Omfattende innflytelse
l
2
3
4
5
6
7

D4

Hvor viktig er ditt bidrag til budsjettet?
Ikke viktig
l
2
3
4
5

D5

Veldig viktig
6

7

Hvor ofte er du spurt om dine meninger nar budsjettet er under utarbeidelse av din
overordnede?
Veldig ofte
Aldri
4
6
7
2
3
5
I

5.

D6

Vennligst svar pa de folgende uttalelser ved a merke av et nummer fra 1 til 7
basert pa folgende skala:

l.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

Veldig sjelden
Sjelden
Av og til
Noenganger

Ganske ofte
Veldig ofte
Nesten bele tiden

Nesten
bele tiden

Veldig
sjelden
Jeg akter a overse visse arbeidsbeslektet aktiviteter
bare fordi de ikke er sett over av ledelsen.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

El

Jeg har justert data for a fremstille utforelsen min pa
l
lik linje med min avdelings ma!.

2

3

4

5

6

7

E2

Nar jeg presenterer data til toppledelsen prnver jeg a
l
unnga a vffire den som formidler darlige nyheter.

2

3

4

5

6

7

E3

Ogsa nar produktiviteten min er i uoverensstemmelse,
l
prnver jeg fremdeles a la det virke konsekvent.

2

3

4

5

6

7

E4
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6.

Vennligst indiker i hvilken grad du er enig eller uenig med f0lgende uttalelser.
Vennligst svar ved a merke av et nummer fra l til 7 basert pa f0lgende skala:
1.

2.
-3.
4.

Svc!:!rt uenig
Moderat uenig
Lite uenig
Verken uenig eller enig

5.

Lite enig
Moderat enig
Svi!:!rt enig

6 ..

7.

Svc!:!rt enig

Svc!:!rt uenig
Toppledelsen har nok informasjon ti! a ha kjennskap til
avvik i et avdelingsbudsjett.
I

2

3

4

5

6

7

Fl

Toppledelsen mottar detaljert informasjon om aktiviteter
for hver avdeling og hvert produkt.
1 2

3

4

5

6

7

F2

Toppledelsen har en mate a finne ut om der er avvik
1
i et avdelingsbudsjett.

2

3

4

5

6

7

F3

Budsjetter utarbeidet for mitt ansvarsomrade er Jett
oppnaelige.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Gt

Budsjetter for mitt ansvarsomrade er ikke Sa!rlig
krevende.

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

G2

Budsjettmal har ikke gitt meg un0dvendige bekymringer
med a forbedre effektiviteten i mitt ansvarsomrade. I
2

3

4

5

6

7

G3

Mal som er innarbeidet i mitt budsjett er vanskelige
oppna.

a
I

2

3

4

5

6

7

G4

I gode forretningstider er min overordnede villig til a
akseptere et forsvarlig niva av avvik i mitt
budsjett.
I

2

3

4

5

6

7

Ht

A vvik i budsjettet er gunstig for a gj0re saker som
ikke kan bli offisielt akseptert.

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

H2

For a forsvare seg, en ansvarlig leder tildeler budsjetter
som kan forsvarlig oppnas.
I

2

3

4

5

6

7

H3

For a sikre seg, en ansvarlig leder setter to nivaer pa
budsjettet: ett mellom han/hun selv og hans/hennes underordnede, og en annen mellom ham/hun selv og hans/hennes
overordnede.
I
2

3

4

5

6

7

H4
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7.

Nevnt nedenfor er en del uttalelser som forstiller mulige felelser som individer
kanskje bar overfor organisasjonen de arbeider for. Med hensyn ti1 dine fe lelser
for organisasjonen du for tiden arbeider i, vennligst indiker i hvilken grad du
er enig eller uenig med hver av de felgende uttalelser ved a merke av et
nummer fra l lil 7 basert pa felgende skala:

I.

2.
3.
4.

SvcErt uenig
Moderat uenig
Lite uenig
Verken uenig eller enig

5.
6.
7.

Lite enig
Moderat enig
SvcErt enig

Svcert enig

Sv.:ert uenig
Jeg er villig til a gi mer enn vanligvis forventet for a
hjelpe denne organisasjonen til a bli fremgangsrik.

i

:j

l

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 11

Jeg snakker om denne organsisajonen til mine venner som
1
en storartet organisasjon a arbeide for.

2

3

4

5

6

7 12

Jeg er sa og si villig til a akseptere hvilket som heist jobb
oppdrag for a kunne fremdeles jobbe for denne
1
organi sasj onen.

2

3

4

5

6

7 13

Jeg betrakter mine verdier og denne organisasjonens verdier
1 2
til a vcere svcert like.

3

4

5

6

7 14

Jeg er stolt over a kunne fortelle andre atjeg er en del av
I
denne organisasjonen.

3

4

5

6

7 15

2

~

:i

Jeg bryr meg virkelig om skjebnen til denne
organsasjonen.

t
1

For meg er dette den beste av alle mulig organisasjoner a
1
arbeide for.

2

3

4

5

6

i

7 16

ii

I

2

3

4

5

6

7 17

Denne organisasjonen inspirerer virkelig det beste ut av meg
1 2
med hensyn ti! arbeidsutffrelse.

3

4

5

6

7 18

Jeg er virkelig glad for atjeg valgte a arbeide for denne
organisasjonen overfor andre jeg vurderte dajeg hie
1
medlem av denne organisasjonen.

3

4

5

6

7 19

2

Du har na fullfsrt halvparten av dette skjemaet.
Jeg er veldig takknemlig for hJelpen din.
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8.

Vennligst svar hvert spersmal ved a merke av et nummer fra 1 til 7 basert pa
hver individuell skala:

Ved sammenligning mea din overordnede, bvem er det som sitter med best informasjon om de
aktivitetesom foretas i ditt ansvarsomrade?
2

5
4
Vi bar omtrent
et samme kvalitet av informasjon

3

Min overordnede
bar mye bedre informasjon

7

6

Jl

Jeg barmye
bedre informasjon

Ved sammenligning med din overordnede, bvem er mer kjent med inndata/utdata forboldet
innarbeidet i de inteme funksjoner i ditt ansvarsomrade?
2
Min overordnede er
mye bedre kjent

4
Vi er omtrent
like mye kjent

3

5

7
J2
Jeger mye
bedre kjent

6

Ved sammenligning med din overordnede, bvem bar mer kjennskap til mulige utforelser i ditt
ansvarsomrade?
2

3

Min overordnede bar
mer kjennskap

4
Vi bar omtrent
like mye kjennskap

5

6

7
J3
Jeg bar mye
mer kjennskap

Ved sammenligning med din overordnede, bvem bar mer teknisk kjennskap ti! arbeidet i ditt
ansvarsomrade?
2
Min overordnede bar
mer kjennskap

3

5
4
Vi bar omtrent
like mye kjennskap

6

7
J4
Jeg bar mye
mer kjennskap

Ved sammenligning med din overordnede, bvem er bedre i stand ti! a vurdere mulig
innvirkning pa dine aktiviteter pa punkter som er ekseteme i ditt ansvarsomrade?
2

3

Min overordnede er
mye bedre i stand ti!

5
4
Vi er omtrent
like mye i stand ti!

6

7

JS

Jeg ermye
bedre i stand til

Ved sammenligning med din overordnede, bvem bar bedre forstaelse for bva som kan bli
oppnadd i ditt ansvarsomrade?
2

Min overordnede bar
mye bedre forstaelse

3

5
4
Vi bar omtrent
like mye forstaelse

6

J6
7
Jeg bar mye
bedre forstaelse
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9.

Av og til sa feler alle seg Utt plaget av forskjellige saker i vart arbeid. Felgende er
en liste av saker som noen ganger plager folk. Hvor ofte feler du deg plaget av hver
av dem? Vennligst svar ved a merke av et nummer fra 1 til 7 basert pa felgende
skala for hvert P'!_nkt.
l.
2.
3.

4.

Veldig sjelden
Sjelden
Av og til
Noen ganger

5.
6.
7.

Ganske ofte
Veldig ofte
Nesten hele tiden

Veldig
sjelden

Nesten hele
tiden

F0ler at du har for liten autoritet tit a utfore ansvaret
som er gitt deg.

2

3

4

5

6

7 Kl

Usikker om hvilken rekkevidde og ansvar som er tilegnet
jobben din.

2

3

4

5

6

7 K2

2

3

4

5

6

7 K3

2

3

4

5

6

7 K4

A ikke vite hvilke muligheter for forfremmelse
eller opprykning som eksisterer for deg.

A fole at arbeidsmengden er for stor for deg slik at det
er umulig a fa gjort det i l0pet av en vanlig arbeidsdag.

A fole at du er ikke i stand fit a tilfredsstille de
motsettende ettersp0rsler fra forskjellige folk over deg.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7 K5

A fole at du ikke er kvalifisert tit a gj0re jobben din.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7 K6

hvordan han eller hun evaluerer utforselen din.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7 K7

Det faktum at du kan ikke fa nok informasjon til a utf0re
jobben din.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7 KS

l

2

3

4

5

6

7 K9

l

2

3

4

5

6

7 KlO

l

2

3

4

5

6

7 Kl 1

I

2

3

4

5

6

7 Kl2

A fole at arbeidsmengden din forstyrrer kvaliteten pa arbeidet. l

2

3

4

5

6

7 Kl3

I

2

3

4

5

6

7 Kl4

l

2

3

4

5

6

7 Kl5

A ikke vite hva din overordnede mener om deg,

A matte bestemme ting som angar livet av individer, folk
du kjenner.

A fole at du kanskje ikke er likt og godkjent av folkene du
arbeider med.

A fole seg ute av stand tit a influere din nrermeste
overordnedes avgj0relser og handlinger som ber0rer deg.

A ikke vite av de folkene du arbeider med hva som ventes
av deg.

A fole at du ma gj fre l0pende saker som er imot din
bed0mmelse.

A fole at jobben din har en tendens tit a forstyrre familie
Iivet ditt.
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10. Vennligst forestill deg en Idell jobb - se bort fra din naverende jobb. I valget av en
idell jobb, av hvor stor betydning vii det vere for deg (vennligst merk av et nummer
for hvert svar).
I.

2.
3.

4.

Av stor betydning
Av betydning
Av moderat betydning

Av liten betydning
Av velding liten eller
ingen betydning

5.

Av stor
betydning

Av ingen
betydning

Ha nok tid tit ditt personlige eller familie liv?

1

2

3

4

5

Ll

Ha utfordrende oppgaver som vii gi deg en personlig
tilfredshet?

1

2

3

4

5

L2

Ha gode fysiske arbeidsforhold (god ventilasjon og lys,
passelig arbeidsplass, osv)?

1

2

3

4

5

L3

Ha tilstrekkelig frihet til a tilegne deg dine egne
fremgangsmater til arbeidet?

1

2

3

4

5

L4

Ha treningsmuligheter (tit a forbedre dine ferdigheter
eller a laere nye ferdigheter)?

1

2

3

4

5

L5

Fu lit ut bruke dine ferdigheter og muligheter pa jobben?

1

2

3

4

5

L6

11.
Vennligst indiker i hvilken grad du er enig eller uenig med de f0lgende
uttalelser.
Sterkt
enig

Sterkt
Enig

2

En organisasjons regler b0r ikke bli
brutt, ogsa nar arbeidstakeren tror at
det er for det beste for organisasjonen.

UbestemtUenig

3

uenig

4

5

Ml

Hvor lenge tror du at du kommer tit a fortsette a arbeide for denne organisasjonen. Vennligst
merk av.
I.

To ar pa det meste

3.

Lengre enn 5 ar
M2

2.

Fra to tit fem ar

4.

Tit jeg pensjoneres

Hvor ofte er du nerv0s eller anspent pa jobben? Vennligst merk av.
4.
Sjelden
I.
Jeg foler alltid slik
2.
Vanligvis
5.
Jeg foler aldri slik
3.
Noen ganger

M3
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12.

Beskrivelsene nedenfor gjelder for fire forskjellige typer sjefer. Les gjennom
disse beskrivelsene ferst:
Sjef 1:

Tar vanligvis beslutninger omgaende og meddeler dem til underordnede
klart og tydelig. Forventer dem til a utfore beslutningene med
lojalitet og utena pa.fore problemer.

Sjef2:

Tar vanligvis beslutninger omgaende men for han/hun gar i gang, pr0Ver
han/huna forklare dem fullstendig til underordnede. Gir dem forklaringer
for bestemmelsene og svarer dem pa de sp0rsmalene de har.

Sjef3:

Radf0rer seg vanligvis med underordnede ffr de treffer beslutninger.
H0rer pa deres rad, betrakter det og sa kunngj0rer belutningene.
Forventer alle til a arbeide med lojalitet for a gjennomf0re det uansett om
deter i samsvar med radet de ga.

Sjef 4:

Samler vanligvis til et m01:e med underordnede nar der er en viktig
beslutning som na tas. Framlegger problemet for gruppen og inviterer til
diskusjon. Aksepterer majoritetens syn som beslutningen.

Vennligst merk av det passende nummer.

Na, for de typer sjefer, hvilken vii du foretrekke a arbeide for.

I.

2.

Sjef 1
Sjef2

3.
4.

Sjef3
Sjef 4

4.

Sjef 4
Passer ikke til
noen av dem
N2

NI

Og hvilken av de fire typer sjefer vii du si beskriver din sjef.
1.

2.
3.

Sjef 1
Sjef2
Sjef3

5.

Hvor ofte, i ditt milj0, er underordnede engstelige for a uttrykke uenighet med engstelige
for a uttrykke uenighet med deres overordnede?
1.
2.

3.

Veldig ofte
Ofte
Noen ganger

4.
5.

Sjelden
Veldig sjelden
N3
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13.

Vennligst svar de felgende spersmal.

Organisasjonens navn (valgfritt):. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Lokalisering (land) av deres
hovedkontor:

---------------------

Nava!rende jobbtittel eller
posisjon: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Hvor lenge har du va!rt i nava!rende
posisjon?

{rr

Hvor mange a.rs erfaring har du i ditt nava!rendes
ansvarsornrade?
{rr
Hvor mange ansatte er der i ditt
ansvarsornrade?

ca

Hvor mange ansatte er der i din organisajon
nasjonalt?

ca

H vor lenge har du bodd i dette
landet?

Ar

F0dsels {rr?

19

Hvilken nasjonalitet er du? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
I hvilket land ble du
f0dt? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Hva er din heyeste kvalifisering?

I.
2.

3.

Videregaende
Heyskole
Universitet

4.

Profesjonelle kvalifikasjoner
5.
Andre
(Klargj0r)_ _ _ __

Hvis du 0nsker A motta en kopi av det konkluderende resultat, vennligst fyll ut folgende:
Navn:
Adresse: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Tusen takk for hjelpenr
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON BUDGETARY ENVIRONMENT

All responses will be treated in strictest confidence. No one in your organisation will have
access to your completed questionnaire.
·

Are budgets used in your organisation

Yes

No

D

D

If your answer is "No", please do not complete the rest of this questionnaire. Please return
the uncompleted questionnaire to me in the enclosed envelope as soon as possible.

Ifyour answer is "Yes", please answer the rest of this questionnaire.

1.

When your superior (your immediate boss) is evaluating your performance, how
much importance do you think he or she attaches to the following items? Please
respond by circling a number from 1 to 7, based on the following scale, for each of
the items listed below.

I.

2.
3.

4.

Never important
Seldom important
Occasionally important
Sometimes important

5.

Often important
Usually important
Always important

6.
7.

Always
important

Never
important

1 2

3

4

5 6

7

short run.

1 2

3

4

5 6

7

How well I get along with my superior.

I

2

3

4

5 6

7

How much effort I put

1 2

3

4

5 6

7

My concern with quality.

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

revenues.

1 2

3

4

5 6

7

My attitude toward the work.

1 2

3

4

5 6

7

My ability to handle my work force.

I

2

3

4

5 6

7

My attitude toward the organisation.

1 2

3

4

5 6

7

1 2

3

4

5 6

7

How well I cooperate with my colleagues.
My ability to meet budgeted targets in the

My long run concern with costs and/or

How well I cooperate with individuals
outside the organisation (e.g. customers)
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2.

Indicate the extent of your agreement with each of the following questions about
the relationship between your superior and yourself. Please circle a number from
1 to 7 based on the following scale:

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

To a very great extent
To a great extent
To some extent

To a little extent
To a very little extent

To a very
great extent

To a very
little extent

Does your superior take advantage of opportunities
that come up to further your interests by his actions
and decisions?

I

2

3

4

5

How free do you feel to discuss with your superior the
problems and difficulties you have in your job without
jeopardising your position or having it "held against" you?

I

2

3

4

5

How confident do you feel that your superior keeps you fully
and frankly informed about things that might concern you?

1

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

Superiors at times must make decisions which seem to be against
the interests of their subordinates. When this happens to you as a
subordinate, how much trust do you have that your superior's
decision is justified by other considerations?

3.

Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following
statement. Please circle a number from 1 to 7 based on the following scale:

l.

2.
3.
4.

Strongly disagree
Moderately disagree
Mildly disagree
Neutral

5.
6.

7.

Mildly agree
Moderately agree
Strongly agree

Strongly
disagree

Strongly
agree

You have learned from your experience during the past two
years that you can trust the other members of top management.

2

3 4

5 6 7

You and the other top managers openly express your differences
and your feelings of encouragement or of disappointment.

2

3 4

5 6 7

You and the others share all relevant infonnation and freely
explore ideas and feelings that may be in or out of your defined
responsibility.

2

3 4

5 6 7

The result has been a high level of give and take and mutual
confidence in each other's support and ability.

2

3 4

5 6 7
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4.

The following items can be used to describe the role you play in the development
of the budget for your area of responsibility. Please respond by circling form l to
7 on the scale for each of the items.

What is the extent of your involvement in the setting of your area of responsibility's budget?

I am involved in setting:
None of the budget
l
2
3

4

5

All of the budget
6
7

What is the extent of the reasoning given by your superior for revision to your budget?
No reasoning
Extensive reasoning
l
2
3
4
5
6
7
How frequently do you give your opinions to your superior about the budget?
Never
Very frequently
l
2
3
4
5
6
7
What is the extent of your influence on the final budget for your area ofresponsibility.
No influence
Extensive influence
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
What is the degree of importance of your contribution to the budget?
No importance
Extensive importance
l
2
3
4
5
6
7
How frequently are you asked for your opinions when the budget is being set by your?
Never
Very frequently
l
2
3
4
5
6
7

5.

Please respond by circling a number from l to 7, based on the following scale.
1.

2.
3.
4.

Very rarely
Rarely
Occasionally
Sometimes

5.
6.
7.

Quite often
Very often
Nearly all the time

Nearly all
the time

Very
rarely
I tend to ignore certain job-related activities simply
because they are not monitored by management.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I have adjusted data to make my performance more
in line with my department goals.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

When presenting data to upper management, I try to
1
avoid being the bearer of bad news.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Even if my productivity is inconsistent, I still try to make it
2
l
appear consistent.

3

4

5

6

7
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6.

Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following
statement. Please circle a number from 1 to 7 based on the following scale:

I.
2.
3.
4.

Strongly disagree
Moderately disagree
Mildly disagree
Neutral

5.
6.
7.

Mildly agree
Moderately agree
Strongly agree

Strongly
disagree

Strongly
agree

Neutral

Top management has enough information to know
if there is slack in a departmental budget.

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

Top management receives detailed information on
activities by department and by product.

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

Top management has a way of finding out if there is
slack in a departmental budget.

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

Budgets set for my area of responsibility are safely
attainable.

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

Budgets for my area of responsibility are not
particularly demanding.
Budgetary targets have not caused me to be
particularly concerned with improving efficiency
in my area of responsibility.

2

I

3

4

5

6

!

1
~

7

l
2

I

3

4

5

6

7
I

Targets incorporated in my budget are difficult to
reach.

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

In good business times, my superior is willing to
accept a reasonable level of slack in my budget.

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

Slack in the budget is good to do things that
cannot be officially approved.

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

To protect himself/herself, a responsibility centre
manager submits budgets that can safely be attained.

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

To be safe, a responsibility centre manager sets two
levels of budgets: one between himself/herself and
his/her subordinates, and another between
himself/herself and his/her superior.

I

2

3

4

5

6

7
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7.

Listed below are a series ofstatements that represent possible feelings that
individuals might have about the organisation for which they work. With respect
to your own feelings about the particular organisation for which you are now
working, please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement with each
of the following statements by circling a number from 1 to 7 based on the
following scale:
1.

2.
3.
4.

Strongly disagree
5.
Moderately disagree
Mildly disagree
Neither disagree nor agree

Mildly agree
6.
Moderately agree
7.
Strongly agree

Strongly
disagree

Strongly
agree

I am willing to put in a great deal of effort
beyond that normally expected in order to
help this organisation be successful.

2

3

4

5

6

7

I talk up this organisation to my friends as a
great organisation to work for.

2

3

4

5

6

7

I would accept almost any type of job
assignment in order to keep working for this
organisation.

2

3

4

5

6

7

I find that my values and this organisation's
values are very similar.

2

3

4

5

6

7

I am proud to tell others that I am part of this
organisation.

2

3

4

5

6

7

I really care about the fate of this organisation.

2

3

4

5

6

7

For me, this is the best ofall possible
organisations for which to work.

2

3

4

5

6

7

This organisation really inspires the very best
in me in the way of job performance.

2

3

4

5

6

7

I am extremely glad that I chose this
organisation to work for over others I was
considering at the time I joined.

2

3

4

5

6

7

YOU HAVE NOW COMPLETED HALF OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
I REALLY APPRECIATE YOU TIME IN HELPING ME
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8.

Please respond to each of the following questions by circling a number from 1 to
7, based on their individual scales:

In comparison with your superior, who is in possession of better information regarding the
activities undertaken in your area ofresponsibility?
2

My superior
has much better
information

4
3
We have about
the same quality
of information

5

7

6

I have
much better
information

In comparison with your superior, who is more familiar with the input-output relationships
inherent in the internal operations of your area ofresponsibility?

1

2

My superior is
much more familiar

4
3
we are about
equally familiar

5

7

6

I am much
more familiar

In comparison with your superior, who is more certain of the performance potential of your
area ofresponsibility?
2

My superior is
much more certain

4
3
We are about
equally certain

5

7

6

I am much
more certain

In comparison with your superior, who is more familiar technically with the work of your area
ofresponsibility?
2

My superior is
much more familiar

4
3
We are about
equally familiar

5

6

7

I am much
more familiar

In comparison with your superior, who is better able to assess the potential impact on your
activities of factors external to your area of responsibility?
2

My superior is
much better able

4
3
We are about
equally able

5

6

7

I am much
better able

In comparison with your superior, who has a better understanding of what cant be achieved in
your area ofresponsibility?
2

My superior is
a much better
understanding

4
3
We have about
the same
understanding

5

6

7

I have a
much better
understanding
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9.

All of us occasionally feel bothered by certain kinds of things in our work. The
following is a list of things that sometimes bother people. How frequently do you
feel bothered by each of them? Please respond by circling a number from 1 to 7,
based on the f?llowing scale.

l.

2.
3.
4.

Very rarely
Rarely
Occasionally
Sometimes

5.
6.

7.

Quite often
Very often
Nearly all the time
Very
rarely

Nearly all
the time

Feeling that you have too little authority to carry
out the responsibilities assigned to you.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Being unclear on just what the scope and responsibilities
of your job are.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not knowing what opportunities for advancement of
promotion exist for you.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Feeling that you have too heavy a work load, one that you
can't possibly finish during an ordinary work day.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Thinking that you'll not be able to satisfy the conflicting
demands of various people over you.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Feeling that you are not fully qualified to handle your job.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not knowing what your superior thinks of you, how he or
she evaluates your performance.

2

3

4

5

6

7

The fact that you can't get information needed to carry out
your job.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Having to decide things that affect the lives of individuals,
people that you know.

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

Feeling unable to influence your immediate superior's
decisions and actions that affect you.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not knowing just what the people you work with expect
of you.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Thinking that the amount of work you have to do may
interfere with how well it gets done.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Feeling that you have to do things on the job that are
against your better judgement.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Feeling that your job tends to interfere with your family life.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Feeling that you may not be liked and accepted by the
people you work with.

l
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10.

Please think of an ideal job - disregarding your present job. In choosing an ideal
job, how important would it be to you (please circle one answer number in each
line across):

I.

4.
5.

Ofutmost importance
Very important
Of moderate importance

2.
3.

Oflittle importance
Of very little or no
importance

Of utmost
importance

Ofno
importance

Have sufficient time left for your personal or family life?

l

2

3

4

5

Have challenging tasks to do, form which you can get a
personal sense of accomplishment?

I

2

3

4

5

Have good physical working conditions (good ventilation
and lighting, adequate work space, etc.)?

I

2

3

4

5

Have considerable freedom to adopt your own approach to
the job?

I

2

3

4

5

Have training opportunities (to improve your skills or learn
new skills)?

I

2

3

4

5

Fully use your skills and abilities on the job?

I

2

3

4

5

11.

Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following
statement:

Strongly
agree Agree

Strongly
Undecided Disagree

An organisation's rules should not be
broken - even when the employee thinks
it is in the organisation's best interests.

2

3

4

5

How long do you think you will continue working for this organisation? Please circle.

I.
2.

Two years at the most
From two to five years

3.

4.

More than 5 years (but I probable
will leave before I retire)
Until I retire

How often do you feel nervous or tense at work? Please circle.

I.

2.
3.

I always feel this way
Usually
Sometimes

4.
5.

Seldom
I never feel this way
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12. The descriptions below apply to four different types of managers. First, please read
through these descriptions:

Manager 1:

Usually makes decisions promptly and communicates them to subordinates
clearly and finnly. Expects them to carry out the decisions loyally and
without raising difficulties.

Manager 2:

Usually makes decisions promptly, but, before going ahead, tries to
explain them fully to subordinates. Gives them the reasons for the
decisions and answers whatever questions they may have.

Manager 3:

Usually consults with subordinates before reaching decisions. Listens to
their advice, considers it, and then announces decisions. Expects all to
work loyally to implement it whether or not it is in accordance with the
advice they gave.

Manager 4:

Usually calls a meeting of subordinates when there is an important
decision to be made. Puts the problem before the group and invites
discussion. Accepts the majority viewpoint as the decision.

Please response by circling the appropriate number.

Now, for the above types of managers, which one would you prefer to work under.

I.

Manager 1

3.

Manager3

2.

Manager2

4.

Manager4

And, to which of the above four types of managers would you say your own superior most
closely corresponds?
1.

Manager 1

4.

Manager4

2.

Manager2

5.

Does not correspond

3.

Manager 3

closely to any of them.

How frequently, in your work environment, are subordinates afraid to express
disagreement with their superiors?

I.

Very frequently

4.

Seldom

2.

Frequently

5.

Very seldom

3.

Sometimes
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13.

Please answer the following questions.

Name oforganisation (Optionally):

-------------------,--

Location (country of your head office:

-----------------

Present job title or position: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
How long have you been in this current
position?

ears

How many years of experience do you have in your current area of
responsibility?

ears

How many employees are there in your area of
responsibility?

approximately

How many employees are there in your organisation
nationally?

approximately

How long have you lived in this
country?
What is your year of birth?

ears
19

What is your nationally? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
In which country were you
born?

---------------------------

What is your highest qualification? (Please circle the appropriate number).
1.

2.

3.

Secondary school
Vocational/Diploma Certificate
University Degree

4.
5.

Professional Qualifications
Others
(Specify)_ _ _ _ __

If you wish to receive a copy of the summarised results, please fill in the following:
Name:
Address: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Thank you very much for your time!

175

APPENDIXC

This appendix contains:
( 1)

Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis and
budgetary participation, (models 1 and 2).

(2)

Normal probability plot for the relationship between budgetary participation
and trust, (model 1).

(3)

Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis,
budgetary participation, trust and propensity to create slack, (model 1).

(4)

Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis and
budgetary participation, trust and job related tension, (model 1).

(5)

Normal probability plot for the relationship between budgetary participation
and organisational commitment, (model 2).

(6)

Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis,
budgetary participation, organisational commitment and propensity to create
slack, (model 2).

(7)

Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis,
budgetary participation, organisational commitment and job related tension,
(model 2).
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis &
budgetary participation (models 1 and 2).
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budgetary participation and
trust, (model 1)
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis, budgetary
participation, trust and propensity to create slack, (model 1)
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis, budgetary
participation, trust and job related tension, (model 1)
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budgetary participation and
organisational commitment, {model 2)
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis, budgetary
participation, organisational commitment and propensity to create slack, (model
~
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis, budgetary
participation, organisational commitment and iob related tension, (model 2)
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APPENDIXD

This appendix contains:
( l)

Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget
emphasis and budgetary participation, (models l and 2).

(2)

Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between
budgetary participation and trust, (model 1).

(3)

Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget
emphasis, budgetary participation, trust and propensity to create slack, (model
1).

(4)

Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget
emphasis and budgetary participation, trust and job related tension, (model l ).

(5)

Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between
budgetary participation and organisational commitment, (model 2).

(6)

Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget
emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational commitment and propensity
to create slack, (model 2).

(7)

Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget
emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational commitment and job related
tension,(model 2).
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget
emphasis & budgetary participation {models 1 and 2).
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budgetary
participation and trust, {model 1)
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget
emphasis, budgetary participation, trust and propensity to create slack, (model 1)
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget
emphasis, budgetary participation, trust and iob related tension, (model 1)
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budgetary
participation and organisational commitment, (model 2)
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget
emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational commitment and propensity to
create slack, (model 2)
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget
emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational commitment and iob related
tension, (model 2)
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